TY - BOOK ID - 29272516 TI - Governing the Commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action. PY - 2005 SN - 0521405998 0521371015 9780521371018 9780521405997 PB - Cambridge Cambridge University press DB - UniCat KW - 330.54 KW - Commons KW - -Social choice KW - Social choice KW - -Choice, Social KW - Collective choice KW - Public choice KW - Common lands KW - Communal land KW - Communal lands KW - 330.54 Nationaal produkt. Sociaal produkt. Transfert social. Sociale herverdeling. Consumptie en produktie KW - Nationaal produkt. Sociaal produkt. Transfert social. Sociale herverdeling. Consumptie en produktie KW - Case studies KW - Law and legislation KW - Commons. KW - Social choice. KW - Beleidskunde. KW - Case studies. KW - Choice, Social KW - Choice (Psychology) KW - Social psychology KW - Welfare economics KW - Land tenure KW - Public lands KW - Real property KW - Marks (Medieval land tenure) KW - Natural resources, Communal KW - Village communities KW - #SBIB:35H400 KW - #SBIB:IO KW - Beleid: algemeen KW - Political sociology KW - AA / International- internationaal KW - 305.6 KW - 338.013 KW - 338.74 KW - Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen. KW - Belang, verdeling en beleid van de natuurlijke rijkdommen. Grondstoffen. KW - Watervoorziening. KW - Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen KW - Belang, verdeling en beleid van de natuurlijke rijkdommen. Grondstoffen KW - Watervoorziening KW - -Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen KW - Commons - Case studies KW - Social choice - Case studies KW - Commons - Case studies. KW - Social choice - Case studies. KW - -Case studies UR - https://www.unicat.be/uniCat?func=search&query=sysid:29272516 AB - The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries. ER -