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Intentionalism --- Emotions and cognition. --- Intentionalism. --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Cognition and emotions --- Cognition

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What do our assumptions about authorship matter for our experience of meaning? This book examines the debates in the humanities and social sciences over whether authorial intentions can, or should, constrain our interpretation of language and art. Scholars assume that understanding of linguistic and artistic meaning should not be constrained by beliefs about authors and their possible intentions in creating a human artifact. It is argued here that people are strongly disposed to infer intentionality when understanding oral speech, written texts, artworks, and many other human actions. Although ordinary people, and scholars, may infer meanings that diverge from, or extend beyond, what authors intend, our experience of human artifacts as meaningful is fundamentally tied to our assumptions of intentionality. This challenges the traditional ideas of intentions as existing solely in the minds of individuals, and formulates a new conceptual framework for examining if and when intentions influence the interpretation of meaning.

Meaning (Psychology) --- Intentionalism. --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Theory of knowledge --- Lexicology. Semantics --- Psycholinguistics --- Health Sciences --- Psychiatry & Psychology

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Cognitive psychology --- Theory of knowledge --- Presentation (Philosophy) --- Object (Philosophy) --- Act (Philosophy) --- Intentionalism --- Philosophy --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Action (Philosophy) --- Agent (Philosophy)

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Consciousness --- Intentionalism --- Will --- Cetanā --- Conation --- Volition --- Ethics --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Self --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Apperception --- Mind and body --- Perception --- Spirit --- Philosophical anthropology

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Tackling some central problems in the philosophy of action, Mele constructs an explanatory model for intentional behavior, locating the place and significance of such mental phenomena as beliefs, desires, reason, and intentions in the etiology of intentional action. Part One comprises a comprehensive examination of the standard treatments of the relations between desires, beliefs, and actions. In Part Two, Mele goes on to develop a subtle and well-defended view that the motivational role of intentions is of a different sort from that of beliefs and desires. Mele, also offers a provocative expl

Act (Philosophy) --- Intentionality (Philosophy) --- Intentionalism. --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Mind and body --- Philosophy --- Action (Philosophy) --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Intentionalism --- Theory of knowledge --- Intentionality (Philosophy).