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World Bank Group President David Malpass remarked that early in the pandemic, the World Bank Group set out to use aggressive financial programming and leverage to increase commitments as rapidly as possible. The World Bank group used a number of powerful financial programming and leveraging techniques toward that goal. He highlighted recent capital increases, aggressive leveraging through bond issuance by IBRD, IDA and IFC, as well as MIGA reinsurance, and private sector mobilization, the combined WBG has been able to provide support to low- and middle-income countries over the last fifteen months. This financing is based on world-class knowledge work, and deep country relationships and know-how in our country teams present on the ground around the world. The World Bank Group strongly supports leveraging donor resources to maximize commitments, respond to emergencies, and prepare for crises. The World Bank Group provides grants to countries that are most in need, including fragile and small states and are investing heavily in social safety nets and digital cash transfer programs. Data sharing by both debtors and creditors enables debt reconciliation, a key for the debt restructuring process and he called on the G20 members to share their lending data and assist in the reconciliation exercise. The Group is actively implementing the Sustainable Development Finance Policy under IDA19 and will continue it in IDA20. The Group continues to strongly and actively support the implementation of the Common Framework, working closely with partners.
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This paper surveys early intellectual antecedents of the Krueger (2001) proposal for creating bankruptcy reorganization procedures at the international level. We focus on actual proposals for new procedures made from the late 1970s up to an influential lecture by Sachs (1995), with brief reference to the formal economics literature on sovereign debt. Beginning with a paper by Oechsli (1981), several key contributions are made during this period, including the analogy with domestic bankruptcy procedures, an understanding of the inefficiencies in international lending that might justify such procedures, and specific institutional and legal suggestions that continue to play a role in the current debate.
Financial Risk Management --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Financial Crises --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Financial crises --- Debt restructuring --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Asset and liability management --- Debts, External --- Costa Rica
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Debt relief --- -Debt relief --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Debtor and creditor --- Law and legislation
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"Debtors have been mocked, scolded, and lied to for decades. We have been told that it is perfectly normal to go into debt to get medical care, to go to school, or even to pay for our own incarceration. We've been told there is no way to change an economy that pushes the majority of people into debt while a small minority hoards wealth and power. Debtors of the world must unite. As isolated individuals, debtors have little influence. But as a bloc, we can leverage our debts and devise new tactics to challenge the corporate creditor class and help win reparative, universal public goods. Individually, our debts overwhelm us. But together, our debts can make us powerful"--
Debt relief. --- Debt relief --- Debt renegotiation --- Debt rescheduling --- Debt restructuring --- Relief, Debt --- Renegotiation, Debt --- Rescheduling, Debt --- Restructuring, Debt --- Debtor and creditor --- Law and legislation
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This paper takes a hard look at the experience with official intervention in sovereign debt crises, focusing on debt crises of the 1980s, Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2001, and Greece in 2010. Based on the track record, the authors argue that in situations where countries face a solvency problem, official intervention is more likely to succeed if official money is lent at the risk-free rate reflecting its seniority and private creditors receive an upfront haircut. Such an approach would limit the costs associated with procrastination and increase the chances of success by enabling a more realistic fiscal program to restore solvency. They examine the moral hazard implications for debtor countries of this proposal and find that these are unlikely to be severe. In fact, after their crises of 1997-2001, emerging market countries embarked on an aggressive and comprehensive program of self-insurance, indicating that they are weary of debt crises and their costs. However, the prospect of an upfront haircut for private creditors in the event of insolvency is likely to make them more diligent in their sovereign lending decisions.
Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Debt Markets --- Debt Restructuring --- Emerging Markets --- External Debt --- Liquidity --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Poverty Reduction --- Seniority --- Solvency --- Sovereign Debt
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This paper takes a hard look at the experience with official intervention in sovereign debt crises, focusing on debt crises of the 1980s, Russia in 1998, Argentina in 2001, and Greece in 2010. Based on the track record, the authors argue that in situations where countries face a solvency problem, official intervention is more likely to succeed if official money is lent at the risk-free rate reflecting its seniority and private creditors receive an upfront haircut. Such an approach would limit the costs associated with procrastination and increase the chances of success by enabling a more realistic fiscal program to restore solvency. They examine the moral hazard implications for debtor countries of this proposal and find that these are unlikely to be severe. In fact, after their crises of 1997-2001, emerging market countries embarked on an aggressive and comprehensive program of self-insurance, indicating that they are weary of debt crises and their costs. However, the prospect of an upfront haircut for private creditors in the event of insolvency is likely to make them more diligent in their sovereign lending decisions.
Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Debt Markets --- Debt Restructuring --- Emerging Markets --- External Debt --- Liquidity --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Poverty Reduction --- Seniority --- Solvency --- Sovereign Debt
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Local government finance has taken on increasing importance in Turkey, with the evolving fiscal decentralization and the growing role of local administrations in public investment. The focus of this policy note is on sub-national borrowing as an essential component of the framework for sustainable sub-national finance. Sound management of sub-national borrowing is important for ensuring debt sustainability. Past problems with fiscal deficits by local administrations in Turkey have led to two major debt restructurings. The Government has undertaken many laudable improvements in the system of fiscal management and control of local administrations in recent years, in particular by regulating the procedures for borrowing, raising the requirements for accounting and reporting, and tightening the terms for Treasury guarantees of foreign borrowing. The rest of the policy note is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the framework for sub-national borrowing in Turkey and reviews areas for further development, including in particular, an effective insolvency mechanism. Section three presents rationales for a sub-national insolvency mechanism and describes how the entry points for reform have contributed to varying modalities across countries. Section four discusses key design issues for a sub-national insolvency mechanism, driven by the fundamental difference between public and private insolvency. Final section five presents possible medium-term reform options for Turkey.
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In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show however, that competition for repayment among lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring.
Exports and Imports --- Financial Risk Management --- Public Finance --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Financial Crises --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Public finance & taxation --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- International economics --- Public debt --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Debt restructuring --- Financial crises --- Debt default --- Debts, Public --- Debts, External --- Argentina
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This paper provides an overview of key elements of Corporate Bankruptcy Codes and Practice around the world that are relevant to the debate on Sovereign Debt Restructuring. It highlights four components common to most bankruptcy reorganization institutions: a stay on debt collection efforts to prevent a costly run for the assets, broad enforcement of absolute priority, majority voting among creditors on the proposed reorganization plan, and new higher priority financing to keep the firm going while its liabilities are restructured. The paper argues that these components ought to be present in any sovereign debt restructuring procedure.
Corporate Finance --- Financial Risk Management --- Investments: Bonds --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Financial Crises --- Bankruptcy --- Liquidation --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Investment & securities --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Debt restructuring --- Financial crises --- Corporate insolvency --- Bonds --- Asset and liability management --- Financial institutions --- Debts, External --- United States
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This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of Belize’s 2016–17 sovereign debt restructuring—its third episode in last 10 years. As was the case in the earlier two restructurings, in 2006–07 and in 2012–13, the 2016–17 debt restructuring was executed through collaborative engagement with creditors outside an IMF-supported program. While providing liquidity relief and partially addressing long-term debt sustainability concerns, the restructuring will need to be underpinned by ambitious fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing structural reforms to secure durable gains.
Financial Risk Management --- Investments: Bonds --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- International Financial Markets --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Fiscal Policy --- Finance --- Investment & securities --- Public finance & taxation --- Debt restructuring --- Sovereign debt restructuring --- Bonds --- Public debt --- Fiscal consolidation --- Asset and liability management --- Financial institutions --- Fiscal policy --- Debts, External --- Debts, Public --- Belize
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