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DECISION MAKING

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS--DECISION MAKING

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This collection portrays NATO's post-Cold War bureaucracy, decision-shaping, and decision-making at Brussels headquarters; identifies changes therein; and evaluates their implications for the pursuit of external security with accompanying shifts in the locus of governance. It does so using the analytical concept of 'internationalization' which draws upon neo-institutionalist insights : a process by which national procedures of a policy area are linked with - or shift to - international organizations and thus enhance their significance. While some chapters centre on NATO's new post-Cold War security environment or changed power structures impacting on Alliance politics, the majority of authors describe NATO's new or adapted administrative bodies, associated operational roles and political procedures, its cooperation with third-party actors, and assess associated levels of internationalization. It becomes clear that although governments evidently remain the key shapers of political processes, they now face the thicker institutional structures of rules and common practices which imply adaptation and changes in national policies.

NATO--DECISION MAKING

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USA--MILITARY POLICY--DECISION MAKING

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How and why do international organizations develop institutional memory from strategic errors ? As the author shows, formal learning processes, ironically, can deter elite officials from sharing their knowledge within the organizations at which they work. Elites have few professional incentives to report failures. Consequently, most memory-building occurs behind the scenes via informal processes, including transnational interpersonal networks. The author rests her argument through extensive, original field research inside one of the world's largest crisis management organizations - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). She conducted interviews and a survey experiment with 120 NATO elites, including almost all NATO ambassadors and military representatives, all assistant secretary generals, and other civilian and military leaders engaged in crisis management decision-making and planning. The author's findings provide insights into NATO's institutional memory of three cases of crisis management in Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine. She argues that formal learning processes alone are insufficient for organizational learning, and she offers recommendations for how international organizations can preserve memory and learn from it, particularly in times of crisis.

NATO--DECISION MAKING --- KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT