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Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control - specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.
Economic sociology --- Political sociology --- Europe --- Japan --- AA / International- internationaal --- EUR / Europe - Europa --- JP / Japan - Japon --- FR / France - Frankrijk --- DE / Germany - Duitsland - Allemagne --- NL / Netherlands - Nederland - Pays Bas --- 650 --- 658.320 --- 347.720.40 --- 323.5 --- 338.046.1 --- Theorieën en grondbeginselen. Management. --- Bezoldiging: algemeenheden. --- Vertegenwoordiging en beheer van vennootschappen: algemeenheden. --- Pressiegroepen. Lobbying. --- Grote ondernemingen. --- Corporate governance --- E-books --- Governance, Corporate --- Industrial management --- Directors of corporations --- Pressiegroepen. Lobbying --- Grote ondernemingen --- Vertegenwoordiging en beheer van vennootschappen: algemeenheden --- Theorieën en grondbeginselen. Management --- Bezoldiging: algemeenheden --- Social Sciences --- Political Science
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Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Representation through Taxation challenges this conventional wisdom. Emphasizing that there are limits to what organized interests can credibly promise in return for favorable treatment, Gehlbach shows that politicians may instead give preference to groups - organized or not. Gehlbach develops this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant, regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems were structured around familiar revenue sources, magnifying this incentive and helping to prejudice policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms to flourish.
Taxation --- 323.5 --- 336.201 --- 336.204 --- EEU / Central & Eastern Europe --- RU / Russia - Rusland - Russie --- Duties --- Fee system (Taxation) --- Tax policy --- Tax reform --- Taxation, Incidence of --- Taxes --- Finance, Public --- Revenue --- Political aspects --- Pressiegroepen. Lobbying --- Fiscaal regime: structuur en evolutie. Fiscale hervorming --- weerslag, invloed, last en verdeling van de belasting --- Social Sciences --- Political Science
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