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2008 (1)

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Book
Quiet politics and business power : corporate control in Europe and Japan
Author:
ISBN: 9780521118590 9780521134132 052111859X 0521134137 9780511760716 9780511858840 0511858841 9780511860584 0511860587 9780511857973 0511857977 051176071X 0511861516 1107213010 1282941933 9786612941931 0511859716 0511857101 9780511861512 9781107213012 9781282941939 6612941936 9780511859717 9780511857102 Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,

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Abstract

Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries - France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands - explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control - specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.


Book
Representation through taxation : revenue, politics, and development in postcommunist states
Author:
ISBN: 9780511510106 9780521887335 9780521168809 9780511438240 0511438249 0511437579 9780511437571 052188733X 9786611903510 6611903518 052188733X 0511510101 0521168805 9780511433924 0511433921 1107200865 1281903515 0511436114 0511435320 0511436890 Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press,

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Abstract

Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Representation through Taxation challenges this conventional wisdom. Emphasizing that there are limits to what organized interests can credibly promise in return for favorable treatment, Gehlbach shows that politicians may instead give preference to groups - organized or not. Gehlbach develops this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant, regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems were structured around familiar revenue sources, magnifying this incentive and helping to prejudice policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms to flourish.

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