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Business cycles --- anno 1900-1999 --- Inflation (Finance) --- Inflation --- Inflation (finance) --- AA / International- internationaal --- 333.844 --- 333.841 --- 333.481 --- 332.41 --- Finance --- Natural rate of unemployment --- Devaluatie en opwaardering. Stabilisering. J curve. --- Inflatie. --- Monetaire crisissen, hervormingen, saneringen en stabilisering. --- Inflation (Finance). --- Monetaire crisissen, hervormingen, saneringen en stabilisering --- Inflatie --- Devaluatie en opwaardering. Stabilisering. J curve
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This paper examines the historical evolution of central bank credibility using both historical narrative and empirics for a group of 16 countries, both advanced and emerging. It shows how the evolution of credibility has gone through a pendulum where credibility was high under the classical gold standard before 1914 before being lost and not fully regained until the 1980s. This characterization does not, however, seem to apply to the monetary history in the emerging markets examined in the paper. Nevertheless, credibility in all the economies examined has been enhanced in recent decades thanks to the adoption of inflation targeting. However, the recent financial crisis and the call for central banks to focus more on financial stability relying on macro prudential regulation may pose significant challenges for central bank credibility.
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In this paper we provide empirical measures of central bank credibility and augment these with historical narratives from eleven countries. To the extent we are able to apply reliable institutional information we can also indirectly assess their role in influencing the credibility of the monetary authority. We focus on measures of inflation expectations, the mean reversion properties of inflation, and indicators of exchange rate risk. In addition we place some emphasis on whether credibility is particularly vulnerable during financial crises, whether its evolution is a function of the type of crisis or its kind (i.e., currency, banking, sovereign debt crises). We find credibility changes over time are frequent and can be significant. Nevertheless, no robust empirical connection between the size of an economic shock (e.g., the Great Depression) and loss of credibility is found. Second, the frequency with which the world economy experiences economic and financial crises, institutional factors (i.e., the quality of governance) plays an important role in preventing a loss of credibility. Third, credibility shocks are dependent on the type of monetary policy regime in place. Finally, credibility is most affected by whether the shock can be associated with policy errors.
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A new measure of credibility is constructed as a function of the differential between observed inflation and some estimate of the inflation rate that the central bank targets. The target is assumed to be met flexibly. Credibility is calculated for a large group of both advanced and emerging countries from 1980 to 2014. Financial crises reduce central bank credibility and central banks with strong institutional determinants tend to do better when hit by a shock of the magnitude of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The VIX, adopting an inflation target and central bank transparency, are the most common determinants of credibility. Similarly, real economic growth has a significant influence on central bank credibility even in inflation targeting economies. Hence, responding to real economic factors is necessarily detrimental to central bank credibility. Nevertheless, caution is in order about whether monetary authorities should take on broader responsibilities for the financial performance of economies.
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Central banks have evolved for close to four centuries. This paper argues that for two centuries central banks caught up to the strategies followed by the leading central banks of the era; the Bank of England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the Federal Reserve in the twentieth century. It also argues that, by the late 20th century, small open economies were more prone to adopt a new policy regime when the old one no longer served its purpose whereas large, less open, and systemically important economies were more reluctant to embrace new approaches to monetary policy. Our study blends the quantitative with narrative explanations of the evolution of central banks. We begin by providing an overview of the evolution of monetary policy regimes taking note of the changing role of financial stability over time. We then provide some background to an analysis that aims, via econometric means, to quantify the similarities and idiosyncrasies of the ten central banks and the extent to which they represent a network of sorts where, in effect, some central banks learn from others.
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Economic order --- Money. Monetary policy --- Eastern and Central Europe --- EEU / Central & Eastern Europe --- HU / Hungary - Hongarije - Hongrie --- 336.61 --- 333.820 --- Monetary policy --- -Monetary policy --- -Banks and banking --- -332.4947 --- Agricultural banks --- Banking --- Banking industry --- Commercial banks --- Depository institutions --- Finance --- Financial institutions --- Money --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Financieel beleid. --- Geldbeleid, bankbeleid en kredietbeleid: algemeenheden. --- Banks and banking --- 332.4947 --- Geldbeleid, bankbeleid en kredietbeleid: algemeenheden --- Financieel beleid
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