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There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be radically mistaken. The science, some argue, recommends a view of conscious agency as merely epiphenomenal: an impotent accompaniment to the whirring unconscious machinery (the inner zombie!) that prepares, decides, and causes our behavior. This volume displays and explores this radical claim, revisiting the folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and “decomposing” the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions. Part I of this volume provides an overview of the scientific research that has been taken to support “the zombie challenge.” Part II explores the phenomenology of agency and what it is like to be the author of one’s own actions. Part III and Part IV then explore different strategies for using the science and phenomenology of human agency to respond to the zombie challenge. Questions explored include: What distinguishes automatic behavior and voluntary action? What, if anything, does consciousness contribute to the voluntary control of behavior? What does the science of human behavior really tell us about the nature of self-control?

Philosophical anthropology --- Volonté --- Free will and determinism --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Volonté.

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General ethics --- Free will and determinism. --- Free will and determinism --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy)

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This title revisits the traditional explanation of freedom of will. O'Connor defines it as reason-guided agent causation and places his argument within a general metaphysics.

Philosophical anthropology --- General ethics --- Determinism (Philosophy). --- Free will and determinism. --- Free will and determinism --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Philosophy

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Free will and determinism --- Subconsciousness --- Unconscious (Psychology) --- Unconsciousness --- Psychology --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Freud, Sigmund --- Philosophical anthropology --- Depth psychology

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Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in some way to reasons, our actions are meaningful and can be judged on their moral (or other) merit. In this highly original work, Nomy Arpaly argues that a deterministic world does not preclude moral responsibility, rationality, and love--in short, meaningful lives--but that there would still be something lamentable about a deterministic world. A person may respond well to reasons, and her actions may faithfully reflect her true self or values, but she may still feel that she is not free. Arpaly argues that compatibilists and semicompatibilists are wrong to dismiss this feeling--for which there are no philosophical consolations--as philosophically irrelevant. On the way to this bittersweet conclusion, Arpaly sets forth surprising theories about acting for reasons, the widely accepted idea that "ought implies can," moral blame, and more.

Free will and determinism. --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Free will and determinism --- Philosophical anthropology