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Le paradoxe fondamental qui vient à la fois constituer et mettre en péril la politique, c'est qu'il n'y a pas d'autorité des institutions et des lois sans le soutien au moins tacite et spontané de la multitude, multitude dont il s'agit en même temps de reconnaître qu'elle est composée d'individus et de groupes sociaux qui désirent n'en faire qu'à leur tête. Ce paradoxe est souvent dénié par les philosophies politiques qui se contentent d'invoquer une légitimité idéale pour justifier une obéissance en droit. Les concepts de disposition et d'habitus, tels qu'ils sont théorisés par Pierre Bourdieu, permettent de comprendre à même la pratique comment s'établit, de fait, la domination d'un ordre. Spinoza, tout en s'accordant sur des points fondamentaux avec le sociologue, insiste néanmoins sur la dimension passionnelle et donc inconstante des dispositions, et par là assume davantage encore le paradoxe. Un pouvoir n'est obéi que s'il sait se faire désirer, qu'il soit légitime ou non. C'est alors une conception de l'État et des institutions politiques tout à fait originale qu'élabore le Traité politique, où il s'agit moins de les fonder en légitimité que de les faire fonctionner malgré, et même par, les passions pourtant inconstantes et variées du vulgaire. Encore faut-il que cette domination s'exerce au profit de tous et de chacun : une Realpolitik, au sens de Pierre Bourdieu, est ainsi constituée par Spinoza, où le pouvoir n'est détenu par personne en particulier, mais dispose tous les citoyens à la concorde et à la paix, malgré eux mais, autant que possible, de bon gré.

Determinism (Philosophy)

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Throughout philosophical history, there has been a recurring argument to the effect that determinism, naturalism, or both are self-referentially incoherent. By accepting determinism or naturalism, one allegedly acquires a reason to reject determinism or naturalism. The Epistemological Skyhook brings together, for the first time, the principal expressions of this argument, focusing primarily on the last 150 years. It concludes by presenting a new version of the argument that synthesizes the best aspects of the others while also rendering the argument immune to some of the most significant objections made to it.

Determinism (Philosophy) --- Naturalism.

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Determinism (Philosophy) --- Ontology. --- Relation (Philosophy) --- Logic --- Ontology --- Philosophy --- Being --- Metaphysics --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Substance (Philosophy)

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This title revisits the traditional explanation of freedom of will. O'Connor defines it as reason-guided agent causation and places his argument within a general metaphysics.

Philosophical anthropology --- General ethics --- Determinism (Philosophy). --- Free will and determinism. --- Free will and determinism --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy) --- Philosophy

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"There is agency in all we do: thinking, doing, or making. We invent a tune, play, or use it to celebrate an occasion. Or we make a conceptual leap and ask more abstract questions about the conditions for agency. They include autonomy and self-appraisal, each contested by arguments immersing us in circumstances we don't control. But can it be true we that have no personal responsibility for all we think and do? Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will proposes that deliberation, choice, and free will emerged within the evolutionary history of animals with a physical advantage: organisms having cell walls or exoskeletons had an internal space within which to protect themselves from external threats or encounters. This defense was both structural and active: such organisms could ignore intrusions or inhibit risky behavior. Their capacities evolved with time: inhibition became the power to deliberate and choose the manner of one's responses. Hence the ability of humans and some other animals to determine their reactions to problematic situations or to information that alters values and choices. This is free will as a material power, not as the conclusion to a conceptual argument. Having it makes us morally responsible for much we do. It prefigures moral identity. Closely argued but plainly written, Agency: Moral Identity and Free Will speaks for autonomy and responsibility when both are eclipsed by ideas that embed us in history or tradition. Our sense of moral choice and freedom is accurate. We are not altogether the creatures of our circumstances."--Publisher's website.

Free will and determinism. --- Compatibilism --- Determinism and free will --- Determinism and indeterminism --- Free agency --- Freedom and determinism --- Freedom of the will --- Indeterminism --- Liberty of the will --- Determinism (Philosophy)