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This paper presents evidence on the characteristic speculative dynamics of a wide range of asset returns. It highlights three stylized facts. First, returns tend to be positively serially correlated at high frequency. Second, returns tend to be negatively serially correlated over long horizons. Third, deviations of asset values from proxies for fundamental value have predictive power for returns. These patterns emerge repeatedly in our analyses of stocks, bonds, foreign exchange, real estate, collectibles, and precious metals, and they appear too strong to be attributed only to small sample biases. The pervasive nature of these patterns suggests that they may be lie to inherent features of the speculative process, rather than to variation in risk factors which affect particular markets.

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The difference between reported price-earnings ratios in the United States and Japan is not as puzzling as it appears at first glance. Nearly half the disparity is caused by differences in accounting practices with respect to consolidation of earnings from subsidiaries and depreciation of fixed assets. If Japanese firms used U.S. accounting rules, we estimate that the P/E ratio for the Tokyo Stock Exchange would have been 32.1, not the reported 54.3, at the end of 1988. Accounting differences are unable, however, to explain the sharp rise in the Japanese stock market during the mid-1980s. Changes in required returns on equities, or in investor expectations of future growth for Japanese firms, must be invoked to explain this phenomenon. Real interest rates declined during the period of rapid price increase, but there is little evidence that growth expectations became more optimistic. The real interest rate changes do not, however, appear large enough to fully account for the change in stock prices.