Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Operational research. Game theory

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Money. Monetary policy

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Are generational accounts informative about the effect of the budget on the intergenerational distribution of resources and (when augmented with generation-specific propensities to consume out of life-time resources) on aggregate consumption and saving? The paper makes three points. First, the usefulness of generational accounts lives or dies with the strict life-cycle model of household consumption. Voluntary intergenerational gifts or liquidity constraints may therefore adversely affect or even destroy their informativeness. Second, even when the life-cycle model holds, generational accounts only measure the effect of the budget on the lifetime consumption of private goods and services. They ignore the intergenerational (re-)distribution associated with the government's provision of public goods and services. Third, generational accounting ignores the effect of the budget on before-tax and before-transfer quantities and prices, including before-tax and -transfer distribution of life-time resources across generations and intertemporal relative prices. That is, it does not handle incidence or general equilibrium repercussions very well. Although useful, generational accounts should therefore carry the label 'handle with great care.'

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The paper analyzes the modalities and consequences of a breakdown of cooperation between the monetary authorities of inflation-prone Periphery Countries that use an exchange rate peg as an anti- inflationary device, when the Center is hit by an aggregate demand shock. Cooperation in the Periphery is constrained to be symmetric: costs and benefits must be equal for all. Our model suggests that there are at least two ways in which a generalized crisis of the exchange rate system may emerge. The first is when the constrained cooperative response of the Periphery is a moderate common devaluation while the non-cooperative equilibrium has large devaluations by a few countries. An exchange rate crisis emerges if Periphery countries give in to their individual incentives to renege on the cooperative agreement. In the second case, the Center shock is not large enough to trigger a general devaluation in the constrained cooperative equilibrium; yet some of the Periphery countries would devalue in the Nash equilibrium, making the monetary stance in the system more expansionary. In this case, reversion to Nash is collectively rational. We offer this model as a useful parable for interpreting the collapse of the EMR in 1992-93.