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This paper uses data on health insurance choices by employees of Harvard University to examine the effect of alternative pricing rules on market equilibrium. In the mid-1990s, Harvard moved from a system of subsidizing more expensive insurance to a system of contributing an equal amount to each plan. We estimate a substantial demand response to the policy change, with a short-run elasticity of about -2. The reform also induced substantial" adverse selection. Because of this selection, the long-run demand response is three times the short-run response. Price variation induced by adverse selection is inefficient; we estimate the magnitude of the welfare loss from adverse selection at 2 percent of baseline health spending. Finally, as insurance choice was made more competitive, premiums to Harvard fell relative to premiums in the Boston area by nearly 10 percent. This savings was large enough to compensate for the inefficiency induced by adverse selection, so that reform overall was welfare enhancing.
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Using new tabulations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and newly released data from the Current Population Survey, this report reexamines the likely effect on insurance premiums in the individual health insurance market of the Health Insurance Act of 1995 (commonly known as "Kassebaum-Kennedy"). A widely cited study by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) estimates that the proposed legislation would increase premiums for those currently buying individual health insurance by over twenty percent. This study estimates a range of effects from 5.5 percent to under one percent. The upper end of the range maintains the HIAA assumptions, but substitutes new tabulations of the figures used in the computation of the estimate. The lower end of the range considers the interaction of the proposed federal legislation and current state insurance regulations.
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We explore the feasibility of catastrophic health insurance established in conjunction with individual health accounts (IHAs). Under this plan, the employer establishes both a high-deductible health insurance plan and an IHA. Employee health care costs below the deductible are then paid out of the IHA; costs above the deductible are paid by the insurance plan. Assets remaining in the account when the employee retires are available for other purposes. Although attractive because it helps to solve the moral hazard problem associated with conventional insurance plans, the scheme may be considered infeasible if medical expenditures over a working life are so persistent that certain individuals accumulate little in the IHA while others accumulate a great deal. Within the context of an illustrative IHA plan, we develop preliminary empirical evidence on the distribution of medical expenditures and hence savings under an IHA plan. Our analysis is based on longitudinal health insurance claims data from a large firm. We emphasize the balance in the IHA account at retirement. Although such a plan would produce a range of balances across employees, approximately 80% would retain over 50% of their contributions. Only about 5% would retain less than 20% of their contributions. The outcomes suggest to us that such a plan is feasible. And, we believe that such a plan could be structured to increase retirement savings.
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Medicare. --- Medical policy --- Health insurance
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Medicare. --- Medical policy --- Health insurance
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