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Urban economics --- Regional economics --- Economie urbaine --- Economie régionale

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Cities and towns --- Urban economics --- Urban policy --- Urbanization --- Villes --- Economie urbaine --- Politique urbaine --- Urbanisation --- Marseille (France) --- Marseille (France) --- Marseille (France) --- Marseille (France) --- Economic conditions --- Conditions économiques

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000.1 --- 911.4 --- Algemene werken --- Economische geografie --- Regional economics --- Urban economics --- Handbooks, manuals, etc --- #SBIB:33H000 --- #SBIB:HIVA --- Cities and towns --- City economics --- Economics of cities --- Economics --- Regional planning --- Regionalism --- Space in economics --- Economie: algemene werken --- Economic aspects --- Economic geography --- Handbooks, manuals, etc. --- Economie régionale --- Economie urbaine --- Guides, manuels, etc --- ELSEVIER-B EPUB-LIV-FT --- Économie urbaine --- Géographie --- Économie régionale --- Regional economics - Handbooks, manuals, etc --- Urban economics - Handbooks, manuals, etc --- Villes

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May 1999 - Institutional arrangements have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems. Colombia's political geography contrasts sharply with its economy. Physical characteristics and guerilla war fragment the country geographically, yet it has a long tradition of political centrism and macroeconomic stability. Recently, with political and economic decentralization, there has been some weakening of macroeconomic performance. Dillinger and Webb explore institutional arrangements that have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems. Fiscal decentralization proceeded rapidly in Colombia. Education, health, and much infrastructure provision have been decentralized to the departmentos and municipios. Decentralization has led to substantial but not overwhelming problems, both in maintaining fiscal balance nationally (as resources are transferred to subnational levels) and in preventing unsustainable deficits by the subnational governments. The problems have arisen because central government interference prevents departments from controlling their costs and because of expectations of debt bailouts. Both are legacies of the earlier pattern of management from the center, and some recent changes-especially about subnational debt-may improve matters. Colombia's traditional political process has had difficulty dealing with problems of decentralization because traditional parties are weak in internal organization and have lost de facto rule over substantial territories. The fiscal problems of subnational government have been contained, however, because subnational governments are relatively weak politically and the central government, for the time being, has been able to enforce restrictions on subnational borrowing. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and Caribbean Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to examine the macroeconomic consequences of decentralization. The authors may be contacted at wdillinger@worldbank.org or swebb@worldbank.org.

Bank --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Budget --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Decentralization --- Decentralization Process --- Deconcentration --- Deficits --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Fiscal Decentralization --- Fiscal Deficits --- Interest --- Intergovernmental Relations --- Laws --- Local Governments --- Macroeconomic Stability --- Municipal Financial Management --- Municipalities --- Public and Municipal Finance --- Public Sector Economics and Finance --- Revenue --- Risk --- Subnational Governments --- Transfers --- Urban Development --- Urban Economics --- Value

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May 1999 - Which factors prevent the rural poor and other socially excluded groups from having access to land in Orissa, India? The authors report on the first empirical study of its kind to examine - from the perspective of transaction costs--factors that constrain access to land for the rural poor and other socially excluded groups in India. They find that: Land reform has reduced large landholdings since the 1950s. Medium size farms have gained most. Formidable obstacles still prevent the poor from gaining access to land; The complexity of land revenue administration in Orissa is partly the legacy of distinctly different systems, which produced more or less complete and accurate land records. These not-so-distant historical records can be important in resolving contemporary land disputes; Orissa tried legally to abolish land-leasing. Concealed tenancy persisted, with tenants having little protection under the law; Women's access to and control over land, and their bargaining power with their husbands about land, may be enhanced through joint land titling, a principle yet to be realized in Orissa; Land administration is viewed as a burden on the state rather than a service, and land records and registration systems are not coordinated. Doing so will improve rights for the poor and reduce transaction costs--but only if the system is transparent and the powerful do not retain the leverage over settlement officers that has allowed land grabs. Land in Orissa may be purchased, inherited, rented (leased), or--in the case of public land and the commons--encroached upon. Each type of transaction--and the State's response, through land law and administration--has implications for poor people's access to land. The authors find that: Land markets are thin and transaction costs are high, limiting the amount of agricultural land that changes hands; The fragmentation of landholdings into tiny, scattered plots is a brake on agricultural productivity, but efforts to consolidate land may discriminate against the rural poor. Reducing transaction costs in land markets will help; Protecting the rural poor's rights of access to common land requires raising public awareness and access to information; Liberalizing land-lease markets for the rural poor will help, but only if the poor are ensured access to institutional credit. This paper--a product of the Rural Development Sector Unit, South Asia Region--is part of a larger effort in the region to promote access to land and to foster more demand-driven and socially inclusive institutions in rural development. Robin Mearns may be contacted at rmearns@worldbank.org.

Access To Land --- Charges --- Common Property Resource Development --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Contracts --- Fees --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Forestry --- Grants --- Income --- Institutional Analysis --- Institutional Reform --- Institutional Reforms --- Land --- Land Tenure --- Land Use --- Land Use and Policies --- Poverty Reduction --- Public --- Public and Municipal Finance --- Public Sector Management and Reform --- Revenue --- Revenue Collection --- Rural Development --- Rural Development Knowledge and Information Systems --- Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction --- Social Exclusion --- State Governments --- States --- Subnational Governance --- Urban Areas --- Urban Development --- Urban Economics --- Urban Governance and Management