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This paper explores the trade-off between incentive effects and administrative costs associated with the implementation of various environmental tax instruments, with special reference to carbon taxes. In a simple model, we show under what conditions it is optimal to use input rather than emission taxes to internalize environmental externalities. Mixed tax regimes are also studied. If linkage of emissions to inputs is close, if abatement possibilities are costly, and if administrative costs of emission taxes are high, emission taxes should not be introduced. It is shown that these conditions directly apply to current tax policies toward CO2 emissions in several European countries that harness pre-existing energy taxes. First, there is a one-to-one correspondence between carbon content of energy and CO2 emissions. Second, only few possibilities exist to abate CO2 emissions separately. Third, energy excises allow to save on administrative costs. Broadening the carbon tax base by removing certain widely-used exemptions for energy production (and possibly adding emission taxes or abatement subsidies for selected industries) is likely to increase incentives for carbon reduction without significant additional administrative costs.

Environmental impact charges. --- Environmental impact charges

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Environmental impact analysis --- Environmental impact analysis. --- Environmental monitoring --- Environnement --- Surveillance

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Economic development. --- Environmental impact analysis.

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May 2000 - How well air and water pollution regulation is implemented depends very much on both the level of economic development and actual environmental quality. Pollution pricing is closer to the dictates of environmental economics than China's formal regulatory statutes would suggest - and there is considerable scope for using economic instruments to reduce China's industrial pollution problems. Wang and Wheeler investigate two aspects of China's pollution levy system, which was first implemented about 20 years ago. First, they analyze what determines differences in enforcement of the pollution levy in various urban areas. They find that collection of the otherwise uniform pollution levy is sensitive to differences in economic development and environmental quality. Air and water pollution levies are higher in areas that are heavily polluted. Second, they analyze the impact of pollution charges on industry's environmental performance, in terms of the pollution intensity of process production and the degree of end-of-pipe abatement for both water pollution and air pollution. Econometric analysis shows that plants respond strongly to the levy by either abating air pollution in the production process or providing end-of-pipe treatment for water pollution. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The authors may be contacted at hwang1@worldbank.org or dwheeler1@worldbank.org.

Air --- Environmental impact charges. --- Pollution.

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Environmental impact charges. --- Environmental policy. --- Tax deductions.