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This study analyzes panel data for 61 countries during 1980–97 and concludes that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the coverage offered to depositors is extensive, when the scheme is funded, and when it is run by the government rather than by the private sector.

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This paper provides a framework to assess the benefits and costs of intervening in a banking crisis. Intervention involves liquidity support and resolution actions. Principal benefits of intervention include avoiding panic and eliminating the economic costs of distorted incentives. Principal costs include fiscal costs and the economic costs of delay. The government’s main decision concerns the length of the resolution horizon—whether to adopt a deliberate or an aggressive resolution strategy. Dominant factors affecting net benefits are the relative size of the banking system and the loss liquidation rate on assets financed by bank loans.

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On March 23, the IMF’s Executive Board selected Horst Köhler as the new Managing Director of the IMF. The text of Press Release No. 00/21 follows:.

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Financial crises are endogenized through corporate and interbank market institutions. Single-bank financing leads to a pooling equilibrium in the interbank market. With private information about one’s own solvency, the best illiquid banks will not borrow but rather will liquidate some premature assets. The withdrawals of the best banks from the interbank market may lead more solvent but illiquid banks to withdraw from the market, until the interbank market collapses. However, multi-bank financing leads to a separating equilibrium in the interbank market. Thus, bank runs are limited to illiquid and insolvent banks, and idiosyncratic shocks never trigger a contagious bank run.

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This paper underscores the importance of the assessment of incentives of the main agents in a financial system as a key element in the analysis of financial system vulnerability and the surveillance over the financial system. We outline a diagnostic approach for the assessment of incentives. This approach highlights the need for additional research on the relationship between institutional structures and financial vulnerabilities.

Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Taxation --- Public Finance --- Environmental Economics --- International Financial Markets --- Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Pension Funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Institutional Investors --- Environmental Economics: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Finance --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Environmental economics --- Tax incentives --- Moral hazard --- Financial sector risk --- Deposit insurance --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Legal support in revenue administration --- Revenue administration --- Environment --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking --- Crisis management --- Financial instruments --- Revenue --- Environmental sciences --- Japan