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• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

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• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

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Capital gain distributions by mutual funds generate tax liability for taxable shareholders, thereby reducing their after-tax returns. Taxable investors who are considering purchasing fund shares around distribution dates have an incentive to delay their purchase until after the distribution, since this will reduce the present value of their tax liability. Non-taxable shareholders, such as those who invest through IRAs and other tax-deferred accounts, face no such incentive for delaying purchase. This paper compares daily shareholder transactions by taxable and non-taxable investors in the mutual funds of a single no-load fund complex around distribution dates. Gross inflows to taxable accounts are significantly lower in the weeks preceding distribution dates than in the weeks following them, but gross inflows to tax-deferred accounts do not change around these dates. This finding suggests that some taxable shareholders time their purchase of mutual fund shares to avoid the tax acceleration associated with distributions. Taxable shareholders who purchase shares just before distribution dates also have shorter holding periods, on average, than those who buy after a distribution. The cost of the distribution-related tax acceleration for pre-distribution buyers is therefore somewhat less than that for those who buy after the distribution.

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The mortgage interest deduction, the property tax deduction, the unique treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied homes, and the absence of taxation on imputed rent from owner-occupied homes all influence the effective cost of housing services. They also affect federal income tax revenues and the distribution of income tax liabilities. We draw on household-level data from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances to analyze how several potential reforms would affect incentives for housing consumption as well as the distribution of income tax burdens. Our analysis recognizes that changing the mortgage interest deduction would induce changes in household financial behavior. We estimate that repealing the mortgage interest deduction in 2003 would have raised income tax revenues by $72.4 billion in the absence of any portfolio adjustments, but by only $61.9 billion if homeowners responded by drawing down a limited set of financial assets to partially replace their mortgage debt. The revenue effects of changing the property tax deduction similarly depend on how state and local governments alter their mix of revenue instruments in response to federal tax reform. Our results underscore the importance of recognizing behavioral responses when calculating the revenue costs of income tax provisions relating to owner-occupied housing.