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In many discussions of ancient philosophy, teleology is acknowledged as an important theme. How do we act for a particular end or purpose? One common answer describes humans as acting with the intention of achieving a goal. A person selects particular actions with the thought that these actions will lead to that goal. Andrew Payne accepts that this is one good answer to our question but proposes that it is not the only one. In Plato's Republic, Socrates appeals to a different understanding of how humans act for the sake of ends as they live together in political communities and pursue knowledge. As they carry out activities that are necessary for human flourishing, their actions can produce unintended results that signal the full completion of human capacities. For example, performing the actions of a just individual can help promote the establishment of a just society as an unintended result. Such unintended results qualify as ends or purposes of human action. This volume fully explores this functional teleology of action in Plato's Republic.

Teleology. --- Action theory. --- Plato. --- Republic (Plato) --- Act (Philosophy). --- PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology. --- Republic (Plato).

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How do sacraments differ from superstition? For Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, both are merely natural actions claiming a supernatural effect, an accusation that has long been ignored in Catholic theology. In Maurice Blondel on the Supernatural in Human Action: Sacrament and Superstition , however, Cathal Doherty SJ reverses this accusation through a theological appropriation of Blondel's philosophy of action, arguing not only that sacraments have no truck with superstition but that the 'Enlightened' are themselves guilty of that which they most abhor, superstitious action. Doherty then uses Blondel's philosophical insights as a heuristic and corrective to putative sacramental theologies that would reduce the spiritual or supernatural efficacy of sacraments to the mere human effort of perception or symbolic interpretation.

Philosophical theology. --- Sacraments --- Superstition --- Act (Philosophy) --- Theology, Philosophical --- Philosophy and religion --- Theology, Doctrinal --- Action (Philosophy) --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Catholic Church. --- Religious aspects. --- Blondel, Maurice, --- Blondel, M. --- Philosophical theology --- Act Philosophy --- Catholic Church --- Religious aspects --- 1 BLONDEL, MAURICE --- #‎GBIB: jesuitica --- 1 BLONDEL, MAURICE Filosofie. Psychologie--BLONDEL, MAURICE --- Filosofie. Psychologie--BLONDEL, MAURICE --- Blondel, Maurizio --- Sacraments - Catholic Church --- Superstition - Religious aspects --- Blondel, Maurice, - 1861-1949

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The book links the concept of intention to human action. It provides answers to questions like: Why do we act intentionally? Which impact do reasons and motives have on our decisions? Certain events are identified as intentional actions when they are considered as being rationalized by reasons. The linguistic description of such events enables us to reveal the structure of intention. The mental and the linguistic constitute irreducible ways of understanding events. Among the topics discussed are intentionality, actions, the linguistic form to talk about intentionality and actions, Brentano’s view of intentionality, the phenomenological approach to intention and Wittgenstein's proposals. The contributions by Wolfgang Künne, Peter Simons, Christian Bermes, Kevin Mulligan, Severin Schroeder, António Marques, Margit Gaffal, Michel Le Du, Jesús Padilla Gálvez, Bernhard Obsieger and Amir Horowitz show that actions and decisions are guided by intentional considerations.

Intentionality (Philosophy) --- Intentionnalité (philosophie) --- Intention (Logic) --- Intention. --- Act (Philosophy) --- Acte (métaphysique) --- Theory of knowledge --- Action (Philosophy) --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Logic --- Reasoning --- Mind and body --- Philosophy of language. --- action. --- intentionality. --- Intentionnalité (philosophie) --- Acte (métaphysique)

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Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others - the most elementary ones - do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless - fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix.

Cognitive psychology --- Philosophical anthropology --- Affective and dynamic functions --- Act (Philosophy). --- Cognitive science. --- Content (Psychology). --- Intentionalism. --- Intentionality (Philosophy). --- Mental representation. --- PHILOSOPHY / Movements / Humanism. --- Phenomenology. --- Philosophy of mind. --- SCIENCE / Cognitive Science. --- Filosofische antropologie --- Psychische functies --- Cognitieve psychologie --- Act (Philosophy) --- Intentionality (Philosophy) --- Content (Psychology) --- Philosophy of mind --- Cognitive science --- Mental representation --- Phenomenology --- PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General --- COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General --- Mental content --- Psychology --- Philosophy, Modern --- Mind and body --- Philosophy --- Representation, Mental --- Abstraction --- Perception --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Action (Philosophy) --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Science --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Metaphysics --- Philosophy / movements / humanism.

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This collection of essays provides the first systematic investigation of practical necessity and offers novel perspectives on this intriguing phenomenon. While debates on necessity often take place in the realm of metaphysics, there is a form of necessity that is pertinent to practical philosophy. “Here I stand. I can do no other,” a phrase habitually attributed to Martin Luther, is often interpreted as revealing underlying normative reasons that exhibit a special kind of necessitating force, experienced as an inescapable constraint by the agent. However, one of the features that make this phenomenon so fascinating is that this constraint is often deciphered as stemming from a form of necessitation that articulates the agent’s autonomy or practical identity. Luther’s saying serves as a leitmotif for an exploration of different claims and challenges related to practical necessity. As the complex philosophical investigations are based on familiar, everyday experiences the book is accessible to any academic readership.

Act (Philosophy) --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Action (Philosophy) --- Causation --- Chance --- Fate and fatalism --- Ontology --- Teleology --- Truth --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Ethics. --- Psychology and religion. --- Moral Philosophy. --- Religion and Psychology. --- Religion and psychology --- Religion --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Values