Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

International relations. Foreign policy --- European Union --- Japan

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This thesis aims to research the potential of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism as an alternative model for dispute resolution in light of the current WTO blockage. The analysis takes on a two-fold approach: first, the thesis provides a comparative analysis of the WTO and EUJEPA dispute settlement mechanisms’ procedural organisation and substantive coverage. Second, the thesis uses Putnam’s two-level game theory structure to look into the political considerations on an international and domestic level which influenced the organisation and jurisdiction of the EUJEPA DSM. Its conclusions are the following. First, the procedural comparison with the WTO and DSM mechanism showcases strong differences in terms of panel selection and the opportunity to an appeal. Party agreement plays a large role in the composition of the panel within the EUJEPA mechanism, as opposed to the WTO mechanism which provides for a quasi-automatic selection process. EUJEPA is also revolutionary in its formalisation of a mediation process within its dispute settlement mechanism. Additionally, the EUJEPA DSM does not provide disputing parties with the possibility to appeal, as opposed to the WTO DSM. While this brings with faster proceedings under EUJEPA, it also means the parties cannot turn to any body in case of disagreement with a panel decision. Regarding substantial coverage of the respective mechanisms, we find that EUJEPA goes beyond WTO-equal norms by introducing a variety of WTO-x norms, which include areas not covered by existing WTO agreements. While this in theory would allow disputing parties to turn to the EUEJPA DSM in both conflicts which cover WTO-equal norms as well as beyond, we observe that several norms have been excluded from EUJEPA’s DSM. We provide two explanations as to why. First, the phrasing of certain EUJEPA provisions provides for a lack of legal enforceability. Second, we note that certain provisions are excluded from the EUJEPA DSM due to a preference for the WTO DSM as the sole avenue of dispute resolution in this area. This underlines the character of EUJEPA’s DSM as a supporting mechanism to the WTO, and not a competing alternative. Last, we researched the impact of political and economic considerations on EPA negotiations and the degree to which they impacted the in- and exclusion of norms into the EUJEPA dispute settlement mechanism. We find that on the EU side, the set-up of the EPA allowed for limited interference on a domestic level (III) on the EU side, given that the EPA extends to exclusive EU competences only. On the other hand, the role of EU bodies (more specifically the European Parliament) has expanded in recent years. We also find that parties are reluctant to put under the DSM provisions in areas in which the parties have developed asymmetrically. Instead, said areas are moved to the field of cooperation and carved out of the dispute settlement mechanism.