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Exhibiting a general view of Mr. Edwards's scheme; with the design and method proposed in these remarks. It is quite beside the purpose of the following remarks to enquire, whether the general scheme of doctrine Mr. Edwards intended to establish in his enquiry be rational and scriptural. It is only the foundation principle we aim to consider: the system built hereupon, whether true or false, is not, by the generality of Calvinistic Divines, made to depend on the same basis. The principal subject: of the book before us is, 'What determines the will?' And through the whale performance great pains is taken to demonstrate, that moral necessity and liberty are convertible terms. The perplexity, confusion, and uncertainty, which disquisitions of this sort are attended with, is sufficiently known. We shall endeavour to keep out of the clouds as much as the nature of the subject; will admit. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).
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This book considers the doctrines of free will and moral agency in light of Christianity. The subject is of such importance as to demand attention, and the most thorough consideration. Of all kinds of knowledge that we can ever obtain, the knowledge of God, and the knowledge of ourselves, are the most important. As religion is the great business, for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends; and as religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker, and so has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful, in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
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"Physical science and material progress are now the absorbing objects of effort. To these all utility is ascribed, to the exclusion of the metaphysical, which lies under the imputation of being both uninteresting and useless. Why this opprobrium and whence the general neglect, the absolute indisposition, to inquire into the structure and conditions of our spiritual being, which, as the source of all our power and all our enjoyments, one might naturally suppose would most interest us, and at the same time, by its mystery, most excite our curiosity? That the discoveries in physics, so varied and so magnificent, have largely contributed to our material comforts, have feasted the intellect and even regaled the imagination, is undoubtedly one cause of this neglect of the science of mind. But there are other reasons, among which we may mention the real difficulties of the subject. These are of two distinct kinds; first, those of ascertaining the truths; and second, those of imparting them after they have been ascertained. The first of these are, in some respects, peculiar. We want to examine that which examines; we want the mind to be employed in observing its own action, i.e., we want it to be doing one thing when it is of necessity doing another. A further difficulty, even in the investigation of the phenomena of mind, arises from the fact that the language applied to metaphysical science is very imperfect as an instrument of thought. The science of mind has very little language of its own, and in adopting for it what has been formed and fitted to another department of knowledge, much confusion and error result. The ambiguity, or various meanings of the terms, so often mislead the investigator himself, that he is not infrequently obliged to relinquish the instrumental aid of words, and directly examine his original ideas and conceptions of the subjects of inquiry. The difficulty of imparting the results in a language so imperfect is obvious, and is increased when it has been discarded in reaching them. But, with all this in appreciation of its benefits and all its recognized difficulties, metaphysics has its peculiar attractions. The questions of every child, the yearnings of the adult, though in expression only occasionally gleaming through the settled gloom of discouragement and despondency, still manifest the fervid curiosity in regard to that mysterious invisible, which knows, thinks, feels and acts; and even in those too busy, too sluggish, or too hopeless to put forth an effort to gratify it. The reason of its being neglected lies not so much in its want of attraction, as in the prevailing idea of its inutility; and this idea, though now magnified by temporary causes, has a foundation in the fact, that no investigation of the nature of our faculties and powers, mental or physical, is essential to that use of them which our early existence demands. For this we have the requisite knowledge by intuition. We can use our powers without studying either anatomy or metaphysics. It is not, then, surprising that we should early direct our attention to the study of those extrinsic substances and phenomena of which more knowledge is obviously and immediately useful. The want of satisfactory results has also had its influence; and perhaps there is no question, the discussion of which has tended more to bring upon metaphysics the reproach of being unfruitful, than that of the "Freedom of the Will." The importance of removing this grand obstruction to the progress of ethics and theology, is appreciated only by those who in their researches have encountered it. They alone have caught glimpses of the radiant fields of speculation which lie beyond; and most men regard the speculations upon it, not only as having furnished no new truth, but as having obscured what was before known"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).
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"I began this Dissertation before I saw Dr. West's second edition of his First Part published with his Second Part: But on hearing, that he was about to publish his sentiments on Liberty and Necessity more largely, suspended the prosecution of my design, that I might see what he should further publish. Since the publication of the second part, I have been necessarily though reluctantly kept back till this time, from finishing what I had begun. At length I send it forth, requesting the candour of all who shall read it. If ever candour to a writer be reasonably requested, it is so, on the deep and difficult subjects brought under consideration in this Dissertation. The quotations from the Doctor's first part, are made according to the pages of the first edition, with which I began. Yet wherever any variation in words, between the first and second editions, has been noticed; the second edition has been followed in that respect. When I quote the first part the page or pages only are referred to. When I quote the second part, I specify the part as well as the pages"--Book. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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"Any substantial contribution to the most difficult of all psychological and moral problems, the reconciliation of the sense of Responsibility with our intellectual conclusions regarding the nature of Choice, must be a service to a true psychology, a consistent theology, and a rational piety. It can hardly be expected that any single mind will at the present time so solve this problem, even with all the aids his predecessors in the discussion afford, as to leave nothing to his successors to elucidate. Yet the present writer would not offer this treatise to the public did he not believe that even to so ancient a debate he had furnished some new thoughts, and brought the difficulty nearer to a solution. If there is a class of thinkers who are perfectly satisfied with the Edwardean method of reconciliation, or who see not the discord to be reconciled, or who find a moral advantage in holding both sides of the contradiction, this work can scarcely be considered as written for them. It is rather dedicated to the acceptance of those who feel the discord, and seek a more satisfactory harmony; of those who recognize the discord as absolute, and reject the doctrine of responsibility; but especially of those who, called to the sacred office of explaining and impressing the law of accountability upon the conscience, appreciate the necessity of making it acceptable to the reason"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).
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Does free will exist? The question has fueled heated debates spanning from philosophy to psychology and religion. The answer has major implications, and the stakes are high. To put it in the simple terms that have come to dominate these debates, if we are free to make our own decisions, we are accountable for what we do, and if we aren't free, we're off the hook.There are neuroscientists who claim that our decisions are made unconsciously and are therefore outside of our control and social psychologists who argue that myriad imperceptible factors influence even our minor decisions to the extent that there is no room for free will. According to philosopher Alfred R. Mele, what they point to as hard and fast evidence that free will cannot exist actually leaves much room for doubt. If we look more closely at the major experiments that free will deniers cite, we can see large gaps where the light of possibility shines through. In Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will, Mele lays out his opponents' experiments simply and clearly, and proceeds to debunk their supposed findings, one by one, explaining how the experiments don't provide the solid evidence for which they have been touted. There is powerful evidence that conscious decisions play an important role in our lives, and knowledge about situational influences can allow people to respond to those influences rationally rather than with blind obedience.Mele also explores the meaning and ramifications of free will. What, exactly, does it mean to have free will -- is it a state of our soul, or an undefinable openness to alternative decisions? Is it something natural and practical that is closely tied to moral responsibility? Since evidence suggests that denying the existence of free will actually encourages bad behavior, we have a duty to give it a fair chance.
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Can we ever act freely if everything we do is determined by our genes, our upbringing and our environment? On the other hand, if everything we do isn't determined, is it just a matter of luck what we do? What are the requirements on acting freely: are they easily satisfied by ordinary people so long as they aren't coerced or manipulated or suffering from compulsion, or does acting freely involve requirements that are difficult or impossible to meet? This introduction to the contemporary free will debate explores these questions in a lively and accessible way, with the emphasis on giving readers the intellectual tools to make their own minds up on this important and controversial topic.