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The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) Occasional Papers is a series of ad hoc publications presenting, in edited form, papers or statements made at meetings, symposiums, seminars, workshops or lectures that deal with topical issues in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and international security. They are intended primarily for those concerned with these matters in Government, civil society and in the academic community. They deal with topical issues in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and international security and are intended primarily for those concerned with these matters in Government, civil society and in the academic community. The subject of this issue is “ways to strengthen the field of verification”, and is presented by two papers in this publication.

Nuclear arms control --- Verification

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Nuclear arms control --- Nuclear arms control --- Strategic Defense Initiative.

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An overview of the CTBT history, verification, and implementation in Germany is provided together with a description of the five German IMS stations and the seismology, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide technologies. Studies on the global performance of the IMS technologies to detect, locate, and identify nuclear and non-nuclear events are presented, as well as various case studies on the application, testing and benchmarking of these technologies. These case studies include, in particular, the North Korean nuclear weapon tests from 2006 to 2016, but also the National Data Center preparedness exercises from 2007 to 2013, the Tohoku earthquake with tsunami and Fukushima reactor accident in 2011, and the Chelyabinsk meteoroid explosion in 2013. Germany signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998, thereby committing to establish a National Data Center (NDC) and to install, operate, and maintain five stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS) for monitoring the compliances with the Treaty. Contributions on various CTBT related topics by authors from the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Hannover (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, BGR), which has been mandated by Germany as the NDC, are presented in this book. Studies on institutional, technical and scientific aspects in the CTBT context are described to highlight recent, current and future work at the German NDC and to contribute to the CTBT monitoring and verification tasks. Nevertheless, this book focuses primarily on those aspects of the verification regime where BGR has expertise as well as BGR's activities and responsibilities as the German NDC and an IMS station operator during the last twenty years. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is dedicated to banning nuclear explosions worldwide. It was negotiated and adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to comprehensively prohibit nuclear testing underground, underwater, and in the atmosphere. It was opened for signature in 1996 and will enter into force as soon as all 44 nuclear technology holder countries, as denoted in Annex 2 to the Treaty, will have signed and ratified it.

Nuclear arms control --- Nuclear arms control --- Verification. --- Verification.

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The treatment of long-range, land-attack, sea-launched, and air-launched cruise missiles has been and will continue to be a major stumbling block in negotiations aimed at controlling strategic nuclear weapons. The existence of both conventional and nuclear variants is a frequently mentioned reason, since it is impossible to distinguish the two types except by close inspection. However, a more fundamental problem is that cruise missiles are carried by platforms--ships, submarines, and bombers--that have many important roles, mostly unrelated to nuclear capabilities, that are the subject of strategic nuclear arms control. This report examines options for controlling both air- and sea-launched cruise missiles within strategic arms control treaties. It assesses these options by the extent to which they provide easily verifiable limits on nuclear cruise missiles, allow substantial deployments of conventional cruise missiles, and avoid operational restrictions on conventional military forces.

Nuclear arms control --- Nuclear arms control --- Cruise missiles.

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Nuclear arms control --- Constitutional law --- Nuclear arms control