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A collection of the 30 most recent resolved insurgencies, covering the period 1978 to 2008, along with a bank of 76 factors that helped or hindered the COIN force in each case and in each phase of each case, supplements an analysis of historical and contemporary insurgencies, providing valuable lessons for U.S. engagement in and support for COIN operations.

Counterinsurgency -- Case studies. --- Counterinsurgency --- Counterguerrilla warfare --- Guerrilla warfare --- Insurgency

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Counterinsurgency --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Military Science - General --- Counterguerrilla warfare --- Guerrilla warfare --- Insurgency

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The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies added 41 new cases to a previously studied set of 30 insurgencies, examining the 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide between World War II and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A key finding of this research was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 11 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly discriminated the outcomes of the cases analyzed. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND study sought to apply the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2013. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi exercise, in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2013 Afghanistan ranks among the historical COIN winners, but its score is equal to those of the lowest-scoring historical wins. This tenuous position points to several areas in need of improvement, but particularly the need to disrupt the flow of insurgent support and the need for the Afghan government and Afghan security forces to better demonstrate their commitment and motivation. Afghanistan in early 2011 scored in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses, suggesting an overall improvement in COIN progress in that conflict by early 2013. However, conditions may change as coalition forces prepare to hand over responsibility for the country's security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces in 2014.

Counterinsurgency --- Military Science - General --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Counterguerrilla warfare --- Guerrilla warfare --- Insurgency --- Afghanistan. --- A-fu-han --- Afeganistão --- Affganistan --- Affghanistan --- Afganistan --- Afġānistān Islāmī Jumhoryat --- Afganistėn --- Afganistėn Myslimėn Respublik --- Afghānistān Islāmī Imārat --- Afghánská islámská republika --- Afghanstan --- Afghanstan Islam Respublikaḣy --- Afhanistan --- Ăfqanıstan --- Ăfqanıstan İslam Respublikası --- Afuganisutan --- Ahyganit --- Apganistan --- Aphganistan --- Da Afġānistān Islāmī Jumhoryat --- Democratic Republic of Afghanistan --- DRA --- Efẍanistan --- Gweriniaeth Islamaidd Affganistan --- Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan --- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan --- Islamic State of Afghanistan --- Islamikong Republika kan Apganistan --- Islamitiese Republiek van Afghanistan --- Islamska republika Afganistan --- Islamskai͡a Rėspublika Afhanistan --- Isli͡amska republika Afganistan --- Jamhuri-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan --- Jomhūrī-ye Eslāmī-ye Afġānestān --- Jumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Afghānistān --- Republic of Afghanistan --- República Democrática de Afganistán --- Republik Islamek Afghanistan --- Tetã Islãrehegua Ahyganit

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"In recognition of the important role that the U.S. military has to play in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, congressional legislation established the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA) in Honolulu in 1994 to provide and facilitate education, training, and research in civil-military operations. This report examines CFE-DMHA's history, activities, and roles to help determine how the missions assigned to it can best be performed to achieve the objectives of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in this domain. The report finds that a center focused on disaster management and humanitarian assistance (DMHA) fulfills important needs that will only grow in the future. After identifying some key concerns with the center's functioning, including a fundamental misalignment of mission and resources, the report concludes that CFE-DMHA should not be abolished, but that it should focus, for now, on a subset of activities and missions. While the Asia-Pacific represents a priority area for DMHA, because of the prevalence and severity of disasters in that region, there is also a need for additional training, engagement, research, and information related to DMHA civil-military coordination in other regions, which a globally oriented center could provide and that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should guide. Based on these conclusions, and after reviewing a number of courses of action, the report concludes that aligning CFE-DMHA with an existing globally oriented organization under OSD would best position the center to serve these purposes"--Publisher's website.

Emergency management --- Humanitarian assistance --- Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. --- United States --- United States. --- Armed Forces --- Civil functions.

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The U.S. strategic security environment has undergone a shift during the past decade: The regional focus on countering violent extremist organizations has given way to long-term global competition against near-peer adversaries Russia and China. Security cooperation, especially with our closest, most-capable (highly capable) allies, is emphasized as a high-priority tool for pursuing an extensive array of overlapping national interests. The United States and its allies recognize that, in a time of increasing requirements and limited resources, they must work in coalitions and engage regional stakeholders by bringing different strengths and perspectives to combined efforts. However, recent operations and efforts suggest that more can be done to create and sustain the mechanisms that increase the effectiveness of joint activities. In this report, researchers present recommendations for enabling the U.S. Army to better prioritize and coordinate its security cooperation activities with its allies for coalition operations and engagements in third countries, allowing it to meet its assigned objectives and strengthen combined capabilities to compete strategically and counter common threats around the world. Researchers adopted a mixed-method approach focused on Australia and the United Kingdom that combined a literature review of findings on security cooperation uses and effectiveness; a database analysis of recent U.S. security cooperation; a historical analysis of secondary sources documenting recent overseas contingency operations; and interviews with key stakeholders.

United States --- United States --- National security --- United States --- Military relations. --- Military policy.