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Book
A book of Britain : an anthology of words and pictures
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Year: 1957 Publisher: London: Hulton,

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Article
The guilt of Prometheus and Indra

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Book
A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Book
The almanack : for SATB (unaccompanied)
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Year: 1968 Publisher: Place of publication unknown Novello & company

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koormuziek --- liederen --- anno 1900-1999 --- England


Digital
A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization
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Year: 2009 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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We revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations, and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization. A capital poor median voter wants to use capital taxes to provide public goods. This results in redistributive public good provision. As a consequence, when all public goods are provided by the central government, capital taxes and public good provision are high. The expectation of high capital taxes, however, results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution. The median voter would therefore like to commit to a lower level of capital taxes. Decentralization provides such a commitment: local governments avoid using capital taxes due to the pressure of tax competition. We therefore obtain that the median voter favors a partial degree of decentralization. The equilibrium degree of decentralization is non-monotonic in inequality, increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision, and decreasing in capital productivity. When public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds, all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized.


Digital
A political economy theory of partial decentralization
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. NBER

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Book
A political economy theory of partial decentralization.
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge National Bureau Of Economic Research.

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Book
Temporarily Possessed: The Semi-Permanent Collection
Authors: --- --- ---
ISBN: 0915557789 Year: 1995 Publisher: New York The New Museum of Contemporary Art

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Art --- History --- art history --- Höfer, Candida --- Komar, Vitaly --- Jones, David --- Grooms, Red --- Zucker, Joe --- LeWitt, Sol --- Vercruysse, Jan --- Nice, Donald --- Allen, Terry --- McCoy, Ann --- Buren, Daniel --- Warhol, Andy --- Oldenburg, Claes --- Holt, Nancy --- Nonas, Richard --- Perejaume --- Rockenschaub, Gerwald --- Rousse, Georges --- Marca-Relli, Conrad --- Aguilar, Laura --- Akiyama, Masami --- Albertson, James --- Arlen, Nancy --- Auste --- Avedisian, Edward --- Baeder, John --- Bauermeister, Mary --- Baranik, Rudolf --- Belcher, Adam --- Bergtold, Susanna --- Haacke, Hans --- Bhavsar, Natvar --- Blachly, Jimbo --- Bramson, Phyllis --- Brauntuch, Troy --- Brown, James Andrew --- Butter, Tom --- Caroompas, Carole --- Carrillo, Eduardo --- Chase, Louisa --- Clark, Larry --- Collin-Thiébaut, Gérard --- Cooling, Janet --- Cointet, de, Guy --- de Paris, Regis --- Adams, Dennis --- Denby, Jillian --- DeSana, Jimmy --- Diamond, Martha --- Dikeou, Devon --- Drasler, Greg --- Drozdik, Orshi --- Duff, Dana --- Duff, John --- Dwyer, Nancy --- Erwitt, Elliott --- Falk, Gary --- Ferrara, Jackie --- Fischer, R.M. --- Flanagan, Bob --- Francisco, Richard --- Frank, Mary --- George, Herbert --- Bourgeois, Louise --- Gonzales-Torres, Felix --- Goodnough, Robert --- Gorchov, Ron --- Gordy, Robert --- Gurrie, Sylvia --- Hall, Susan --- Hassan, Jamelie --- Hatch, Tom --- Haring, Keith --- Hendon, Robert Chambless (Cham) --- Hilton, Joseph --- Hine, Lewis W. --- Hitch, Stewart --- Holty, Carl Robert --- Hsieh, Tehching --- Hull, John --- Hull, Richard --- Humphrey, Ralph --- Huttinger, Peter --- Jacquette, Yvonne --- Jeff --- Johnson, Guy --- Jones, Kim --- Kardon, Dennis --- Kleinbard, Alexa --- Knutson, Ann --- Komoski, Bill --- Kosolapov, Aleksander --- Kouakou, Koffi --- Spero, Nancy --- Laemmle, Cheryl --- Lamm, Leonid --- Lees, John --- Weiner, Lawrence --- Garouste, Gérard --- Lobe, Bob --- Lobello, Peter --- Lucero, Michael --- Matzko, Claudia --- Mendelsohn, John --- Milder, Jay --- Moffett, Donald --- Mogavero, Michael --- Moore, Claire --- Muller, Dolores --- Musters, Paulus --- Nakahashi, Kenji --- Newman, Laura --- Oji, Helen --- Parada, Esther --- Pardo, Manuel --- Plimack Mangold, Sylvia --- Provisor, Janis --- Rand, Archie --- Rankin, Aimée --- Reed, David --- Robbins, Bruce --- Rose, Robin --- Rose, Stephanie --- Rothenberg, Erika --- Rukhin, Yevgeny --- Santos, René --- Saret, Alan --- Schapiro, Miriam --- Schlessinger, Mark --- Shea, Judith --- Shields, Alan --- Sigler, Holly --- Silverman, Martin --- David, Michael --- Siskind, Aaron --- Spretnjak, Steve --- Staley, Earl --- Staller, Jan --- Stein, Louis --- Stevens, May --- Stikas, Marianne --- Stockley, Charles --- Stone, Sylvia --- Summers, Jamie --- Sunshine, Norman --- Torres Monsó, Francesco --- Tower, Cindy --- Boltanski, Christian --- Byars, James L. --- Vergara, Camilo José --- Way, Jeff --- Wiley, Gary --- Willenbecher, John --- Winogrand, Garry --- Woffard, Philip --- Steinbach, Haim --- Zapkus, Kesitus --- Chryssa --- Olitski, Jules --- Rauschenberg, Robert --- Sonnier, Keith --- Meyerowitz, Joel --- Acconci, Vito --- Ryman, Robert --- Holzer, Jenny --- Kelly, Mary --- Meireles, Cildo --- Judd, Donald --- Artschwager, Richard --- Close, Chuck --- Estes, Richard --- Lawler, Louise --- McCollum, Allan --- Nauman, Bruce --- Rivers, Larry --- Schnabel, Julian --- Sugimoto, Hiroshi --- Wiley, William --- Nevelson, Louise --- Montano, Linda --- Hamilton, Ann --- Steir, Pat --- Africano, Nicholas --- Baer, Josephine Gail --- Beauchamp, Robert --- Bloom, Barbara --- Burson, Nancy --- Colescott, Robert --- Dunning, Jeanne --- Katz, Alex --- Levine, Les --- Marclay, Christian --- Negro, Marylene --- Saunders, David --- Serrano, Andres --- Venet, Bernar --- Wodiczko, Krysztof --- Wojnarowicz, David --- Bell, Charles --- Therrien, Robert --- Winters, Robin --- Jenkins, Paul --- Kolář, Jiří --- Simpson, Lorna --- Bearden, Romare --- Rosen, Kay --- Copley, William --- Calder, Alexander --- Jensen, Alfred --- Matta-Clark, Gordon --- Applebroog, Ida --- New Museum of Contemporary Art [New York, N.Y.] --- Epoxy Art Group --- Act Up --- Gran Fury [New York, N.Y.] --- Group Material [New York, N.Y.] --- The X-Art Foundation --- anno 1970-1979 --- anno 1980-1989 --- anno 1990-1999 --- anno 1900-1999


Book
A Political Economy Theory of Partial Decentralization
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Abstract

We revisit the classic problem of tax competition in the context of federal nations, and derive a positive theory of partial decentralization. A capital poor median voter wants to use capital taxes to provide public goods. This results in redistributive public good provision. As a consequence, when all public goods are provided by the central government, capital taxes and public good provision are high. The expectation of high capital taxes, however, results in a small capital stock which lowers returns to redistribution. The median voter would therefore like to commit to a lower level of capital taxes. Decentralization provides such a commitment: local governments avoid using capital taxes due to the pressure of tax competition. We therefore obtain that the median voter favors a partial degree of decentralization. The equilibrium degree of decentralization is non-monotonic in inequality, increasing in the redistributive efficiency of public good provision, and decreasing in capital productivity. When public goods are heterogeneous in their capacity to transfer funds, all voters agree that goods with high redistributive capacity should be decentralized.

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