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Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.

Dictatorship. --- Elections --- Corrupt practices. --- Absolutism --- Autocracy --- Tyranny --- Authoritarianism --- Despotism --- Totalitarianism --- Election fraud --- Election law --- Criminal provisions --- Dictatorship --- Corrupt practices --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Polls --- Political science --- Politics, Practical --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation

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Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.

Dictatorship.

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This paper explores the conditions under which public spending could minimize violent conflict related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of the state as a prize or because it undermines the state' bureaucratic penetration. Yet, little has been said on how oil wealth could be used to prevent the onset of violent conflict through public spending by buying off citizens and elites, increasing state legitimacy by providing basic services, or strengthening the military and security apparatus. The empirical analysis (148 countries over 1960-2009) shows that higher levels of military spending are associated with lower risk of small- and large-scale conflict onset in countries rich in oil and gas. By contrast, in economies with little natural resources, increases in military spending are associated with a higher risk of conflict. Welfare expenditure is associated with lower risk of small-scale conflict, irrespective of the level of oil revenue. However, general government spending does not appear to have any robust mitigating effects.

Civil War --- Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- Education --- Health, Nutrition and Population --- Natural Resources --- Oil --- Panel Data --- Peace & Peacekeeping --- Population Policies --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Public Spending --- Resource Curse --- Social Conflict and Violence --- Social Development --- Social Spending --- State Capacity --- Welfare Spending