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This paper reviews the nature of central bank involvement in 26 episodes of financial disturbance and crises in Latin America from the mid-1990s onwards. It finds that, except in a handful of cases, large amounts of central bank money were used to cope with large and small crises alike. Pouring central bank money into the financial system generally derailed monetary policy, fueled further macroeconomic unrest, and contributed to simultaneous currency crises, thereby aggravating financial instability. In contrast, when central bank money issuance was restricted and bank resolution was timely executed, financial disturbances were handled with less economic cost. However, this strategy worked provided appropriate institutional arrangements were in place, which highlights the importance of building a suitable framework for preventing and managing banking crises.
Financial crises --- Monetary policy --- Crashes, Financial --- Crises, Financial --- Financial crashes --- Financial panics --- Panics (Finance) --- Stock exchange crashes --- Stock market panics --- Crises --- Banks and Banking --- Financial Risk Management --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Financial Crises --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Banking crises --- Monetary base --- Bank resolution --- Banks and banking --- Money supply --- Crisis management --- Ecuador
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This paper reviews central banks’ legal reform in Latin America during the 1990s and discusses the status of central bank independence in the region. Based on this information, it builds a simplified index of central bank independence which, in addition to the commonly used criteria of political and economic independence, incorporates provisions of central banks’ financial autonomy, accountability, and lender-of-last-resort. The paper finds a moderate negative correlation between increased central bank independence and inflation during 1999–2001 in 14 Latin American countries. Dissagregating the index, the same analysis suggests that economic independence is the key component driving the observed negative correlation between legal central bank independence and inflation.
Banks and Banking --- Inflation --- Public Finance --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Banking --- Macroeconomics --- Public finance & taxation --- Central bank autonomy --- Central bank accountability --- Legal support in revenue administration --- Central banks --- Prices --- Central bank legislation --- Revenue administration --- Banks and banking --- Revenue --- Venezuela, República Bolivariana de
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This paper stresses three factors that amplified the 1990s financial crisis in Ecuador, namely institutional weaknesses, rigidities in public finances, and high financial dollarization. Institutional factors restricted the government's ability to respond in a timely manner and efficiently enough to prevent the escalation of the banking crisis and spurred the adoption of suboptimal policy decisions. Public finance rigidities limited the government's capacity to correct existing imbalances and the deteriorating fiscal stance associated with the costs of the financial crisis. Financial dollarization increasingly reduced the effectiveness of financial safety nets, fostered foreign currency demand, and accelerated a currency crisis, thereby further worsening the solvency of banks. These three factors reinforced each other, exacerbating costs as the economy went through a triple banking, currency, and fiscal crisis.
Financial crises --- Fiscal policy --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Economic policy --- Finance, Public --- Crashes, Financial --- Crises, Financial --- Financial crashes --- Financial panics --- Panics (Finance) --- Stock exchange crashes --- Stock market panics --- Crises --- Government policy --- Ecuador --- Economic conditions --- Banks and Banking --- Financial Risk Management --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Economic History: Government, War, Law, and Regulation: Latin America --- Caribbean --- Economywide Country Studies: Latin America --- Financial Crises --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Monetary Policy --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Banking crises --- Currencies --- Bank deposits --- Money --- International reserves --- Central banks --- Dollarization --- Monetary policy --- Banks and banking --- Foreign exchange reserves
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This paper provides a brief historical journey of central banking in Latin America to shed light on the debate about monetary policy in the post-global financial crisis period. The paper distinguishes three periods in Latin America’s central bank history: the early years, when central banks endorsed the gold standard and coped with the collapse of this monetary system; a second period, in which central banks turned into development banks under the aegis of governments at the expense of increasing inflation; and the “golden years,” when central banks succeeded in preserving price stability in an environment of political independence. The paper concludes by cautioning against overburdening central banks in Latin America with multiple mandates as this could end up undermining their hard-won monetary policy credibility.
Banks and banking, Central--Latin America. --- International finance. --- Monetary policy--Latin America. --- Banks and Banking --- Financial Risk Management --- Inflation --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Monetary Policy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: Latin America --- Caribbean --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Financial Crises --- Banking --- Macroeconomics --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Monetary economics --- Financial crises --- International reserves --- Central bank legislation --- Prices --- Central banks --- Currencies --- Money --- Banks and banking --- Foreign exchange reserves --- Chile
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This paper reviews central bank legislation in 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1990s. Using panel regressions, we find a negative relationship between legal central bank independence (CBI) and inflation. This result holds for three alternative measures of CBI and after controlling for international inflation, banking crises, and exchange regimes. The result is also robust to the inclusion of a broader indicator of structural reforms that usually go along with changes in central bank legislation, illustrating the complementary nature of various aspects of economic reform. The paper fails, however, to find a causal relationship running from CBI to inflation.
Banks and banking, Central -- Caribbean Area. --- Banks and banking, Central -- Latin America. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Inflation (Finance) -- Caribbean Area. --- Inflation (Finance) -- Latin America. --- Banks and Banking --- Inflation --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Institutions and the Macroeconomy --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Banking --- Public finance & taxation --- Central bank autonomy --- Structural reforms --- Legal support in revenue administration --- Prices --- Banks and banking --- Revenue --- Ecuador
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This paper addresses the question of why inflation has not yet converged to price stability in Central America and the Dominican Republic and is currently relatively high by Latin American standards. It suggests that despite the institutional strengthening of monetary policy, important flaws remain in most central banks, in particular a lack of a clear policy mandate and little political autonomy, which are adversely affecting the consistency of policy implementation. Empirical analysis reveals that all central banks raise interest rates to curtail inflation but only some of them increase it sufficiently to effectively tackle inflation pressures. It also shows that some central banks care simultaneously about exchange rate stability. The potential policy conflict arising from a dual central bank mandate and the unpredictable policy response is probably undermining markets' confidence in central banks' commitment to price stability, thereby perpetuating an inflation bias.
Banks and Banking --- Foreign Exchange --- Inflation --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banking --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Macroeconomics --- Exchange rates --- Central bank autonomy --- Real exchange rates --- Banks and banking --- Prices --- Dominican Republic
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This paper identifies key aspects that countries willing to officially dollarize must necessarily address. Based on country experiences, it discusses the critical institutional bases that are necessary to unilaterally introduce a new legal tender, describes the relevant operational issues to smooth the transition toward the use of the new currency, and identifies key structural reforms that are necessary to favor the sustainability over time of this monetary regime. The paper is aimed at providing preliminary guidance to policy makers and practitioners adopting official dollarization. The paper does not take a position on how appropriate this monetary arrangement is. Experiences from adopting dollarization in Ecuador, El Salvador, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Timor-Leste are illustrated briefly.
Banks and Banking --- Financial Risk Management --- Inflation --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Crises --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Monetary economics --- Banking --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Macroeconomics --- Currencies --- Dollarization --- Financial crises --- Money --- Monetary policy --- Banks and banking --- Prices --- El Salvador
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There is increasing interest in loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DTI) limits as many countries face a new round of rising house prices. Yet, very little is known on how these regulatory instruments work in practice. This paper contributes to fill this gap by looking closely at their use and effectiveness in six economies—Brazil, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, Poland, and Romania. Insights include: rapid growth in high-LTV loans with long maturities or in the number of borrowers with multiple mortgages can be signs of build up in systemic risk; monitoring nonperforming loans by loan characteristics can help in calibrating changes in the LTV and DTI limits; as leakages are almost inevitable, countries strive to address them at an early stage; and, in most cases, LTVs and DTIs were effective in reducing loan-growth and improving debt-servicing performances of borrowers, but not always in curbing house price growth.
Financial risk management --- Bank loans --- Housing --- Dwellings --- Home prices --- House prices --- Housing prices --- Residential real estate --- Bank credit --- Loans --- Risk management --- Data processing. --- Management. --- Prices. --- Prices --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Real Estate --- Industries: Financial Services --- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Housing Supply and Markets --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Finance --- Property & real estate --- Monetary economics --- Macroprudential policy instruments --- Credit --- Financial institutions --- Money --- Financial sector policy and analysis --- Economic policy --- Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, People's Republic of China
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We study the link between central bank independence and inflation by providing narrative and empiricial evidence based on Latin America’s experience over the past 100 years. We present a novel historical dataset of central bank independence for 17 Latin American countries and recount the rocky journey traveled by Latin America to achieve central bank independence and price stability. After their creation as independent institutions, central bank independence was eroded in the 1930s at the time of the Great Depression and following the abandonement of the gold exchange standard. Then, by the 1940s, central banks turned into de facto development banks under the aegis of governments, sawing the seeds for high inflation. It took the high inflation episodes of the 1970s and 1980s and the associated major decline in real income, and growing social discontent, to grant central banks political and operational independence to focus on fighting inflation starting in the 1990s. The empirical evidence confirms the strong negative association between central bank independence and inflation and finds that improvements in independence result in a steady decline in inflation. It also shows that high levels of central bank independence are associated with reductions in the likelihood of high inflation episodes, especially when accompanied by reductions in central bank financing to the central government.
Macroeconomics --- Economics: General --- Banks and Banking --- Inflation --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Economic History: Macroeconomics --- Growth and Fluctuations: Latin America --- Caribbean --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Economics of specific sectors --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Central bank autonomy --- Central banks --- Prices --- Central bank legislation --- Bank credit --- Money --- Central bank organization --- Currency crises --- Informal sector --- Economics --- Credit --- Argentina
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We study the link between central bank independence and inflation by providing narrative and empiricial evidence based on Latin America’s experience over the past 100 years. We present a novel historical dataset of central bank independence for 17 Latin American countries and recount the rocky journey traveled by Latin America to achieve central bank independence and price stability. After their creation as independent institutions, central bank independence was eroded in the 1930s at the time of the Great Depression and following the abandonement of the gold exchange standard. Then, by the 1940s, central banks turned into de facto development banks under the aegis of governments, sawing the seeds for high inflation. It took the high inflation episodes of the 1970s and 1980s and the associated major decline in real income, and growing social discontent, to grant central banks political and operational independence to focus on fighting inflation starting in the 1990s. The empirical evidence confirms the strong negative association between central bank independence and inflation and finds that improvements in independence result in a steady decline in inflation. It also shows that high levels of central bank independence are associated with reductions in the likelihood of high inflation episodes, especially when accompanied by reductions in central bank financing to the central government.
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