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A Companion to Hermeneutics is a collection of original essays from leading international scholars that provide a definitive historical and critical compendium of philosophical hermeneutics; Offers a definitive historical, systematic, and critical compendium of hermeneutics ; Represents state-of-the-art thinking on the major themes, topics, concepts and figures of the hermeneutic tradition in philosophy and those who have influenced hermeneutic thought, including Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Foucault, Habermas, and Rorty ; Explores the art and theory of interpretation as it intersects with a number of philosophical and inter-disciplinary areas, including humanism, theology, literature, politics, education and law ; Features contributions from an international cast of leading and upcoming scholars, who offer historically informed, philosophically comprehensive, and critically astute contributions in their individual fields of expertise ; Written to be accessible to interested non-specialists, as well as professional philosophers.

History of philosophy --- Theory of knowledge --- Hermeneutics --- Herméneutique --- Philosophy --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Herméneutique.

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Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), one of the towering figures of contemporary Continental philosophy, is best known for Truth and Method, where he elaborated the concept of ""philosophical hermeneutics,"" a programmatic way to get to what we do when we engage in interpretation. Donatella Di Cesare highlights the central place of Greek philosophy, particularly Plato, in Gadamer's work, brings out differences between his thought and that of Heidegger, and connects him with discussions and debates in pragmatism. This is a sensitive and thoroughly readable philosophical portrait of one of the 20t

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, --- Gadamer, Hans-Georg --- Filosofi --- Hermeneutik

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This dissertation is devoted to offering a thorough reassessment of Heidegger's relationship to Plato, which is at the service of a better understanding of the centrality of man's proper comportment towards what remains hidden. To this end, I have argued that Heidegger's various interpretations of Plato can be gathered together and put at the service of illuminating the developments of and shifts in Heidegger's own thinking. In particular, this dissertation is guided by three specific claims: (1) the development of Heidegger's interpretations of Plato is not smooth and linear, but rather oscillating or wavering; (2) Heidegger's encounter with Plato's philosophy is more distinct from, more enduring than, and more formative for his own thought than his encounter with any other figure in the history of philosophy; and (3) the discontinuity and continuity expressed in Heidegger's frequently divergent interpretations of Plato can best be understood as interwoven with Heidegger's own development and deepening of the problem of hiddenness (un-truth) and unhiddenness (truth). From the outset I have asked what is it that makes Heidegger's encounter with Plato so important for an understanding of his own philosophical positions on the centrality of hiddenness to phenomenology. My conclusion is that his readings of Plato testify to a form of hiddenness operative in Heidegger's own thinking; the secrecy of Plato's thought remains hidden from Heidegger's phenomenological reading and, as such, this hiddenness becomes determining in its very indeterminacy. What I mean by this is that Heidegger's ways of interpreting Plato leave little room for acknowledging that Plato himself "loves to hide" and that it might just be possible to read Plato prior to the epochs of metaphysics and their very transformation of the essence of truth and Being. In this dissertation I have sought to investigate the spectre of Plato in Heidegger's writings and, in doing so, to put my finger on the issue that causes Heidegger to oscillate so wildly - namely, the problem of the hidden in the unhidden and Plato's mindfulness (or lack thereof) of the crucial role and importance of hiddenness in the life of thought. As such, I have not attempted to resolve these tensions or oscillations, but rather to see them and render them thematic. Above all, I attempt to clarify how it is that an examination of hiddenness, in the light of Heidegger's confrontations with Plato, can help us to comprehend the driving motivation of Heidegger's own questioning. Moreover, as a consequence of understanding this motivation, one can subsequently gain a better insight into the nature of self-hiddenness and the very challenge it poses to a phenomenology of lived interpretation. In the final reckoning, I hold that the only way to understand Heidegger's own thought is to accept the fact that discontinuity and finitude are intrinsic to the enactment of his own phenomenological ways. What I have tried to bring out in the discussion of 'Heidegger's Plato' is the need to appraise it with new criteria and not simply to interpret it in terms of its chief and most troublesome characteristics. In other words, I have intentionally avoided simply asking why Heidegger was unfair in his liberal interpretations of Plato, or why he ignored the philosophical bounty that Plato's uniquely dramatic and aporetically driven account of truth and human existence offered him. In conclusion, by looking at the nature of man's comportment towards the hidden, and its Platonic lineage, we are forced to examine the accent that the later Heidegger places on the positive dimension of myth and its power to preserve, treasure, and commemorate the hidden in the unhidden, or what could be termed the enigma of truth and its fundamental counter-essence. This is the self-refusal or self-seclusion of the hiddenness that belongs to truth. It cannot be emphasized enough, however, that Heidegger is not simply concerned with what remains merely hidden, but rather with self-hiddenness and self-withdrawal. Consequently, truth's counter-essence, understood as self-seclusion or self-hiddenness, is a self-withdrawal for the sake of beings (the accessibility and intelligibility of beings) in their unhiddenness. However, I am not content to address the centrality and efficacy of myth in its power to preserve the hidden from being lost to the unhidden. I subsequently provide a leading clue as to what is at stake in Heidegger's analysis of man's proper, non-determining and 'treasuring comportment' towards the hiddenness that belongs to the unhidden. In the final analysis, what I term a 'treasuring comportment' is only comprehensible in terms of a solicitous turning towards the hidden which is preserved in the saying of myth and, in so doing, of commemorating an intrinsic and noble hiddenness which makes itself felt (or exerts a hold over me) precisely as hidden. It is precisely this solicitous turning around or treasuring that I would like to set off against any form of thinking that understands itself in terms of its acts of value constitution or its estimation of the world of things.