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This book introduces the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the human person to a contemporary audience, and reviews the ways in which this view could provide a philosophically sound foundation for modern psychology. The book presents the current state of psychology and offers critiques of the current philosophical foundations. In its presentation of the fundamental metaphysical commitments of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view, it places the human being within the broader understanding of the world. Chapters discuss the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of human and non-human cognition as well as the relationship between cognition and emotion. In addition, the book discusses the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of human growth and development, including how the virtue theory relates to current psychological approaches to normal human development, the development of character problems that lead to psychopathology, current conceptions of positive psychology, and the place of the individual in the social world. The book ends with a summary of how Aristotelian-Thomistic theory relates to science in general and psychology in particular. The Human Person will be of interest to psychologists and cognitive scientists working within a number of subfields, including developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and clinical psychology, and to philosophers working on the philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and the interaction between historical philosophy and contemporary science, as well as linguists and computer scientists interested in psychology of language and artificial intelligence. .

Psychology --- Philosophy. --- Cognitive psychology. --- Philosophy of mind. --- Personality. --- Social psychology. --- Psychology. --- Ontology. --- Cognitive Psychology. --- Philosophy of Mind. --- Personality and Social Psychology. --- History of Psychology. --- Personal identity --- Personality psychology --- Personality theory --- Personality traits --- Personology --- Traits, Personality --- Individuality --- Persons --- Self --- Temperament --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Philosophy --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Psychology, Cognitive --- Being --- Necessity (Philosophy) --- Substance (Philosophy) --- Behavioral sciences --- Mental philosophy --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Soul --- Mental health --- Mass psychology --- Psychology, Social --- Human ecology --- Social groups --- Sociology

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St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa contra gentiles (SCG) is a peculiar work that has occasioned a myriad of interpretations. It has been understood variously as an exercise in what today is called natural theology, as a missionary manual (either intended to educate student missionaries on how to convert unbelievers or to be put directly into the hands of unbelievers so as to convince them of the truth of the Christian faith), as a Summa philosophica, as an exhortation to live a life of wisdom, and as an apologetic work. The reasons for the variety of interpretations are fairly plain. Upon assuming for himself the mantle of a wise man and explaining that he will treat the truths about God professed by the Catholic faith, Thomas splits the work into two main parts: the first part treats those truths about God for which natural reason is adequate while the second part treats those (distinctively Christian) truths about God for which natural reason is entirely incompetent.  A work that so bifurcates the knowledge of God, between what is knowable through natural means and then what is known through revelation alone, is otherwise unheard of in the 13th century. This split is the primary cause of the variety of interpretations that the work has occasioned. Coupled with the fact that Thomas himself never clearly identifies why he is so splitting the truths about God (nor are we left with a well-preserved historical fact on the matter), the peculiarity of structure has been a fertile ground for differing interpretations. In the dissertation I provide an account of the SCG by presenting how human nature is understood throughout. This may well seem peculiar, because the work, as noted, explicitly treats the knowledge of God - not human nature. However, the work is not about some sort of disembodied knowledge of God, but how concrete humans can and do understand God. For Thomas, one cannot know the nature of a thing without making recourse to its power and operation. Knowledge of a thing's operation (or action) yields knowledge of power, which, in turn, yields knowledge of the thing's nature. I explain (given the 'operation yields power yields nature' principle) how the SCG is a description of the power to know God and how this description itself yields a knowledge of human nature as the human being is directed to its highest and most noble object - God. In order to accomplish this, I show how human nature is manifested differently as God is approached differently. When God's internal operations (knowing and willing) are discussed, then human nature is presented according to how humans say things about God; when God's externally directed operation (that of creating) is discussed, we see one of the greatest expositions in the Thomist corpus on the unification of the soul and body; when God is presented as the end of all things, Thomas also provides one of his most elaborate treatments of human desire. I contend that the SCG's elucidation of the human knowledge of God is, at all points, a twofold movement concurrently describing the human truths of the divine nature and circumscribing that (human) nature trying to come to an understanding of God. In the process of advancing these claims, I show that the SCG - even on the side of the bifurcation that restricts the content of discussion to those truths for which natural reason is adequate - proceeds according to what Thomas himself understood to be a theological plan and method. The purpose and method of the work, in both its parts, is explicitly theological. As to what purpose a description of the human capacity to know God according to strictly natural means but which proceeds according to the method of a theological endeavor might be, we cannot be certain (Thomas does not tell us). However, I provide a suggestion: the first part of the SCG can be understood as a 'theoretical circumscription' of what human reason could achieve if, somehow, the error with which human reason is usually mixed could be held in abeyance. If grace acts upon but does not destroy nature, then it would seem to be incumbent upon the theologian and believer to understand the capacities of that nature as fully as possible. The SCG satisfies this requirement. Understanding the limits and capacities of the human knowledge of God is, for Thomas, the best way to understand human nature, because in this one understands how the human being relates to its highest and most noble object. The SCG is such a project of describing the limits and capabilities of the human being and itself is, then, a mirror of human nature. St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa contra gentiles (SCG) is a peculiar work that has occasioned a myriad of interpretations. It has been understood variously as an exercise in what today is called natural theology, as a missionary manual (either intended to educate student missionaries on how to convert unbelievers or to be put directly into the hands of unbelievers so as to convince them of the truth of the Christian faith), as a Summa philosophica, as an exhortation to live a life of wisdom, and as an apologetic work. The reasons for the variety of interpretations are fairly plain. Upon assuming for himself the mantle of a wise man and explaining that he will treat the truths about God professed by the Catholic faith, Thomas splits the work into two main parts: the first part treats those truths about God for which natural reason is adequate while the second part treats those (distinctively Christian) truths about God for which natural reason is entirely incompetent. A work that so bifurcates the knowledge of God, between what is knowable through natural means and then what is known through revelation alone, is otherwise unheard of in the 13th century. This split is the primary cause of the variety of interpretations that the work has occasioned. Coupled with the fact that Thomas himself never clearly identifies why he is so splitting the truths about God (nor are we left with a well-preserved historical fact on the matter), the peculiarity of structure has been a fertile ground for differing interpretations. In the dissertation I provide an account of the SCG by presenting how human nature is understood throughout. This may well seem peculiar, because the work, as noted, explicitly treats the knowledge of God - not human nature. However, the work is not about some sort of disembodied knowledge of God, but how concrete humans can and do understand God. For Thomas, one cannot the first part of the SCG can be understood as a 'theoretical circumscription' of what human reason could achieve if, somehow, the error with which human reason is usually mixed could be held in abeyance. If grace acts upon but does not destroy nature, then it would seem to be incumbent upon the theologian and believer to understand the capacities of that nature as fully as possible.  The first part of the SCG satisfies this requirement. Understanding the limits and capacities of the human knowledge of God is, for Thomas, the best way to understand human nature, because in this one understands how the human being relates to its highest and most noble object. The SCG is such a project of describing the limits and capabilities of the human being and itself is, then, a mirror of human nature.