Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Altruism --- Helping behavior --- Public goods --- Charity --- Economic aspects --- AA / International- internationaal --- 361 --- 201 --- Openbare onderstand en weldadigheid. Menslievendheid. Sociaal hulpbetoon. --- Sociologie: algemeenheden. --- #SBIB:17H25 --- Sociale wijsbegeerte: economische orde en arbeid --- Altruïsme --- Economie: ethische en morele aspecten --- Altruïsme. --- Economie: ethische en morele aspecten. --- Altruistic behavior --- Unselfishness --- Conduct of life --- Goods, Public --- Finance, Public --- Welfare economics --- Free rider problem (Economics) --- Behavior, Helping --- Human behavior --- Interpersonal relations --- Caring --- Alms and almsgiving --- Sociologie: algemeenheden --- Openbare onderstand en weldadigheid. Menslievendheid. Sociaal hulpbetoon --- Altruism - Economic aspects --- Helping behavior - Economic aspects

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Traditionelle Vertriebssysteme wie Filial- oder Verbundsysteme werden zunehmend durch aggressive Franchising-Netzwerke verdrängt, weil sie nach vorherrschender Meinung sehr gut zur Verfolgung anspruchsvoller Expansionsziele geeignet sind. Ein strategischer Erfolgsfaktor von Franchising-Netzwerken sind die durch Informations- und Kommunikations-Infrastruktur (IuK) erschließbaren Effizienzpotenziale im Wertschöpfungssystem. Stephan J. Meier analysiert, ob Franchising-Netzwerke im Vergleich zu alternativen stationären Vertriebskonzepten, insbesondere Filialsystemen, spezifische Anforderungen an die IuK stellen und ob Web Services-Technologien tatsächlich das ihnen zugeschriebene Effizienzpotenzial aufweisen. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung steht die bessere Integration bislang heterogener Insellösungen mit dem Ziel, flexible, prozessorientierte Anwendungen zu finden. Die Ergebnisse beruhen auf strukturationstheoretischen Überlegungen in Verbindung mit der Informationsflussanalyse.

Sales management. --- Management. --- Sales/Distribution. --- Management.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Prosocial incentives and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives are seen by many firms as an effective way to motivate workers. Recent empirical results seem to support the expectation that prosocial incentive, e.g. in the form of a charitable donations by the firm, can increase effort and motivation - sometimes even better than monetary incentives. We argue that the benefits crucially depend on the perceived intention of the firm. Workers use prosocial incentives as a signal about the firm's type and if used instrumentally in order to profit the firm, they can backfire. We show in an experiment in collaboration with an Italian firm, that monetary and prosocial incentives work very differently. While monetary incentives used instrumentally increase effort, instrumental charitable incentives backfire compared to non-instrumental incentives. This is especially true for non-prosocially-motivated workers who do not care about the prosocial cause but use prosocial incentives only as a signal about the firm. The results contribute to the understanding of the limits of prosocial incentives by focusing on their signaling value to the agent about the principal's type.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

We test the effectiveness of self-help peer groups as a commitment device for precautionary savings, through two randomized field experiments among 2,687 microentrepreneurs in Chile. The first experiment finds that self-help peer groups are a powerful tool to increase savings (the number of deposits grows 3.5-fold and the average savings balance almost doubles). Conversely, a substantially higher interest rate has no effect on most participants. A second experiment tests an alternative delivery mechanism and shows that effects of a similar size can be achieved by holding people accountable through feedback text messages, without any meetings or peer pressure.