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We estimate world cycles using a new quarterly dataset of output, credit and asset prices assembled using IMF archives and covering a large set of advanced and emerging economies since 1950. World cycles, both real and financial, exist and are generally driven by US shocks. But their impact is modest for most countries. The global financial cycle is also much weaker when looking at credit rather than asset prices. We also challenge the view that syncronization has increased over time. Although this is true for prices (goods and assets), this not true for quantities (output and credit). The world business and credit cycles were as strong during Bretton Woods (1950–1972) as during the Globalization period (1984-2006). For most countries, the way their output co-moves with the rest of the world has changed little over the last 70 years. We discuss the reasons behind these new findings and their policy implications for small open economies.
Business cycles. --- Economic cycles --- Economic fluctuations --- Cycles --- Finance: General --- Investments: Bonds --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Business Fluctuations --- Open Economy Macroeconomics --- International Policy Coordination and Transmission --- Price Level --- Inflation --- Deflation --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Financial Crises --- Monetary economics --- Investment & securities --- Finance --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Asset prices --- Credit --- Bond yields --- Financial integration --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Prices --- Money --- Financial institutions --- Financial markets --- Financial crises --- Bonds --- International finance --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- United States
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Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.
Banks and banking. --- Agricultural banks --- Banking --- Banking industry --- Commercial banks --- Depository institutions --- Finance --- Financial institutions --- Money --- Banks and Banking --- Investments: Metals --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Corporate Culture --- Diversity --- Social Responsibility --- Metals and Metal Products --- Cement --- Glass --- Ceramics --- Monetary Policy --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Investment & securities --- Monetary economics --- Gold --- Gold reserves --- International reserves --- Currencies --- Commodities --- Central banks --- Monetary base --- Foreign exchange reserves --- Banks and banking --- Money supply --- United States
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This paper assesses the strength of business cycle synchronization between 1950 and 2014 in a sample of 21 countries using a new quarterly dataset based on IMF archival data. Contrary to the common wisdom, we find that the globalization period is not associated with more output synchronization at the global level. The world business cycle was as strong during Bretton Woods (1950-1971) than during the Globalization period (1984-2006). Although globalization did not affect the average level of co-movement, trade and financial integration strongly affect the way countries co-move with the rest of the world. We find that financial integration de-synchronizes national outputs from the world cycle, although the magnitude of this effect depends crucially on the type of shocks hitting the world economy. This de-synchronizing effect has offset the synchronizing impact of other forces, such as increased trade integration.
Business cycles. --- Globalization. --- Commerce. --- Trade --- Economics --- Business --- Transportation --- Global cities --- Globalisation --- Internationalization --- International relations --- Anti-globalization movement --- Economic cycles --- Economic fluctuations --- Cycles --- Traffic (Commerce) --- Merchants --- Exports and Imports --- Finance: General --- Foreign Exchange --- Macroeconomics --- Globalization --- Business Fluctuations --- Open Economy Macroeconomics --- International Policy Coordination and Transmission --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Financial Aspects of Economic Integration --- Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Globalization: General --- Finance --- International economics --- Economic growth --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Financial integration --- Trade integration --- Business cycles --- Exchange rate arrangements --- Financial markets --- Economic integration --- International finance --- International economic integration --- United States
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One Ring to Rule Them All? New Evidence on World Cycles.
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Do Old Habits Die Hard? Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle.
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This paper analyzes the behavior of gross capital inflows across 34 emerging markets (EMs). We first confirm that aggregate inflows to EMs co-move considerably. We then report three findings: (i) the aggregate co-movement conceals significant heterogeneity across asset types as only bank-related and portfolio bond and equity inflows do co-move; (ii) while global push factors in advanced economies mostly explain the common dynamics, their relative importance varies by type of flow; and (iii) the sensitivity to common dynamics varies significantly across borrower countries, with market structure characteristics (especially the composition of the foreign investor base and the level of liquidity) rather than borrower country’s institutional fundamentals strongly affecting sensitivities. Countries relying more on international funds and global banks are found to be more sensitive to push factors. Our findings suggest that EMs need to closely monitor their lenders and investors to assess their inflow exposures to global push factors.
Capital movements. --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. --- Investments, Foreign -- United States. --- Investments, Foreign. --- Banks and Banking --- Exports and Imports --- Finance: General --- Investments: Bonds --- Investments: Stocks --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- Financial Aspects of Economic Integration --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- International Financial Markets --- Pension Funds --- Non-bank Financial Institutions --- Financial Instruments --- Institutional Investors --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- International Investment --- Long-term Capital Movements --- Investment & securities --- Banking --- Finance --- International economics --- Stocks --- Bonds --- Stock markets --- Capital inflows --- Financial institutions --- Financial markets --- Balance of payments --- Capital flows --- Banks and banking --- Stock exchanges --- Capital movements --- United States
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This paper highlights how changes in the composition of demand affect income dispersion in the short run. We first document how the share of aggregate spending dedicated to labour-intensive goods and services shrinks (expands) during downturns (booms), and argue that this contributes to the observed pro-cyclicality of employment and output in labour-intensive industries. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model, we then assess how this demand composition channel influences the cyclical properties of the income distribution. Consistent with empirical evidence, we find income inequality to be countercyclical due to changes in the level of employment and (to a lesser extent) relative factor prices. The model also shows that wealth redistribution policies can potentially involve a trade-off between equality and output, depending on how they affect the composition of aggregate demand.
Demand (Economic theory) --- Income distribution --- Economic policy --- Supply and demand --- Production (Economic theory) --- Econometric models. --- Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions --- Factor Income Distribution --- Employment --- Unemployment --- Wages --- Intergenerational Income Distribution --- Aggregate Human Capital --- Aggregate Labor Productivity --- Wage Level and Structure --- Wage Differentials --- Aggregate Factor Income Distribution --- Labor Economics: General --- Labour --- income economics --- Income inequality --- Income --- National accounts --- Labor economics --- Economic theory --- United States
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We test whether foreign demand matters for local house prices in the US using an identification strategy based on the existence of “home bias abroad” in international real estate markets. Following an extreme political crisis event abroad, a proxy for a strong and exogenous shift in foreign demand, we show that house prices rise disproportionately more in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of population originating from the crisis country. This effect is strong, persistent, and robust to the exclusion of major cities. We also show that areas that were already expensive in the late 1990s have experienced the strongest foreign demand shocks and the biggest drop in affordability between 2000 and 2017. Our findings suggest a non-trivial causal effect of foreign demand shocks on local house prices over the last 20 years, especially in neighbourhoods that were already rather unaffordable for the median household.
Infrastructure --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Real Estate --- Demography --- International Factor Movements and International Business: General --- International Financial Markets --- Housing Supply and Markets --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis --- Housing --- Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location: General --- Demographic Economics: General --- Property & real estate --- Monetary economics --- Macroeconomics --- Population & demography --- Housing prices --- Foreign currency exposure --- Real estate prices --- Population and demographics --- Prices --- Money --- National accounts --- Foreign exchange market --- Saving and investment --- Population --- United States
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We test whether foreign demand matters for local house prices in the US using an identification strategy based on the existence of “home bias abroad” in international real estate markets. Following an extreme political crisis event abroad, a proxy for a strong and exogenous shift in foreign demand, we show that house prices rise disproportionately more in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of population originating from the crisis country. This effect is strong, persistent, and robust to the exclusion of major cities. We also show that areas that were already expensive in the late 1990s have experienced the strongest foreign demand shocks and the biggest drop in affordability between 2000 and 2017. Our findings suggest a non-trivial causal effect of foreign demand shocks on local house prices over the last 20 years, especially in neighbourhoods that were already rather unaffordable for the median household.
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Media Sentiment and International Asset Prices.
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