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Created by Théodule Ribot in 1876 and published without interruption ever since, Revue philosophique is the oldest French academic journal in philosophy. The journal is published quarterly. It includes featured articles, critical reviews, notes, and documents. A significant section is also dedicated to book reviews. The journal is open to all fields of philosophy, without exception. Some issues collect articles around a common theme, while others address various topics. The journal accepts articles written in the major European languages. Submitted articles are evaluated anonymously by two reviewers before being examined by the peer-review board.
Philosophy --- Filosofie. --- Philosophie --- PUBLICACIONES PERIODICAS. --- Philosophical Overview --- Hedonism --- Stoicism --- Overview, Philosophical --- Overviews, Philosophical --- Philosophical Overviews --- Philosophies --- Pharmacy Philosophy --- Pharmacy Philosophies --- Philosophies, Pharmacy --- Philosophy, Pharmacy --- Philosophy. --- Mental philosophy --- Humanities
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Ruyer, Raymond --- #FHIW:CAT1 --- #TS:KOMA --- #FHUS: Zeitschriften --- Periodicals --- Philosophy --- Philosophie --- --revue --- --Philosophy --- Arts and Humanities --- --#FHIW:CAT1 --- Périodiques --- CAIRN-E EJPHILO EPUB-ALPHA-R EPUB-PER-FT
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"The principal aim of this work is to study the development of the mind as it abstracts and generalises, and to show that these two operations exhibit a perfect evolution: that is to say, they exist already in perception, and advance by successive and easily determined stages to the more elevated forms of pure symbolism, accessible only to the minority. It is a commonplace to say that abstraction has its degrees, as number its powers. Yet it is not sufficient to enunciate this truism; the degrees must be fixed by clear, objective signs, and these must not be arbitrary. Thus we shall obtain precise knowledge of the various stages in this ascending evolution, and stand in less danger of confounding abstractions highly distinct by nature. Moreover, we avoid certain equivocal questions and discussions that are based entirely upon the very extended sense of the terms to abstract and to generalise. Accordingly we have sought to establish three main periods in the progressive development of these operations: (1) inferior abstraction, prior to the appearance of speech, independent of words (though not of all signs); (2) intermediate abstraction, accompanied by words, which though at first accessory, increase in importance little by little; (3) superior abstraction, where words alone exist in consciousness, and correspond to a complete substitution. These three periods again include subdivisions, transitional forms which we shall endeavor to determine. This is a study of pure psychology, from which we have rigorously to eliminate all that relates to logic, to the theory of knowledge, to first principles of philosophy. We are concerned with genesis, with embryology, with evolution only. We are thus thrown upon observation, upon the facts wherein mental processes are enunciated, and discovered. Our material, and principal sources of information, lie therefore: (1) for inferior abstracts, in the acts of animals, of children, of uneducated deaf-mutes; (2) for intermediate abstracts, in the development of languages, and the ethnographical documents of primitive or half-civilised peoples; (3) for superior abstracts, in the progressive constitution of scientific ideas and theories, and of classifications. This volume is a ršum ̌of lectures given at the Collg̈e de France in 1895"--Pref. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved).
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Psychologists have given much study to the effects of attention, but very little to its mechanism. The latter point is the only one that I propose to investigate in the following work. Yet even within these limits the question is important, for it is, as we shall later see, the counterpart, the necessary complement of the theory of association. If the present treatise contributes, be it ever so little, to point out clearly this want of contemporaneous psychology, and to induce others to supply it, it will have accomplished its purpose. It will be conformable to the rule of a sound method only to study cases that are marked and typical; that is to say, those which present at least one of the following two characteristics: intensity and duration. When both these coincide, attention is at its maximum. Duration alone reaches the same result through accumulation: as, for instance, when one deciphers a word or a figure by the light of several electrical sparks. Intensity alone is equally efficacious. The purpose of this series of essays is to establish and prove the following propositions: There are two well-defined forms of attention: the one spontaneous, natural; the other voluntary, artificial. Attention (we here once more and for the last time recall the fact, that we shall only study the clearest cases) consists accordingly in the substitution of a relative unity of consciousness for the plurality of states, for the change which constitutes the rule. Yet this does not suffice to define attention. A very bad toothache, a nephritic colic, or intense enjoyment produce a momentary unity of consciousness, which we do not confuse with attention proper. Attention has an object; it is not a purely subjective modification: it is a cognition, an intellectual state. This is an additional characteristic to be noted. This is not all. To distinguish it from certain states which approach it, and which will be studied in the course of our work (for example, fixed ideas), we must take account of the adaptation that always accompanies it, and which, as we shall attempt to establish, in a great measure constitutes its character. In what does this adaptation consist? For the present, let us limit ourselves to an entirely superficial view. In cases of spontaneous attention, the whole body converges toward its object, the eyes, ears, and sometimes the arms; all motions are arrested. In cases of voluntary attention adaptation is most frequently incomplete, intermittent, without solidity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).
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This book was originally published prior to 1923, and represents a reproduction of an important historical work, maintaining the same format as the original work. While some publishers have opted to apply OCR (optical character recognition) technology to the process, we believe this leads to sub-optimal results (frequent typographical errors, strange characters and confusing formatting) and does not adequately preserve the historical character of the original artifact. We believe this work is culturally important in its original archival form. While we strive to adequately clean and digitally enhance the original work, there are occasionally instances where imperfections such as blurred or missing pages, poor pictures or errant marks may have been introduced due to either the quality of the original work or the scanning process itself. Despite these occasional imperfections, we have brought it back into print as part of our ongoing global book preservation commitment, providing customers with access to the best possible historical reprints. We appreciate your understanding of these occasional imperfections, and sincerely hope you enjoy seeing the book in a format as close as possible to that intended by the original publisher.
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Psychologie --- Psychology --- Imagination --- Creativite
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