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We develop and estimate an entry model for second price and open outcry independent private value auctions where potential bidders receive an imperfectly informative signal about their value prior to deciding whether to pay a sunk entry cost. In this way the model flexibly allows for selection on values, which will affect an entrant's subsequent competitiveness, at the entry stage. As signals become more informative, the entry process exhibits greater selection as firms with higher values are more likely to enter. We allow for asymmetries across bidders and unobserved heterogeneity across auctions, which are important features of most data sets. We show how incorrectly assuming the extremes of either no selection (no signal) or perfect selection (prior knowledge of one's value) - the common alternatives in the literature - can yield incorrect estimates of model primitives and bias the results from counterfactuals. We apply our model to U.S. Forest Service timber auctions and find strong evidence in favor of a selective entry process. We take advantage of the flexible entry model to reevaluate the well known theory result that with fixed participation a seller prefers an extra bidder over the ability to set an optimal reserve price. In our model, the relative value of setting a reserve price and increasing the number of potential entrants to a revenue-maximizing seller will depend on the degree of selection. Our structural estimates imply that, if the USFS wants to maximize revenues, it will benefit more from adding an additional potential entrant than setting an optimal reserve price.
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A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency.
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In thinly traded markets for heterogenous, durable goods, such as housing, intermediaries may play especially important roles. Using a unique micro-level dataset of housing transactions in Los Angeles from 1988-2008 and a novel research design, we identify and measure the importance of two very distinct types of intermediaries, also known as "flippers". The first type act as middlemen who quickly match sellers and buyers, operate throughout housing market cycles and earn above average returns when they buy and sell. The second type act as speculators who attempt to time markets by holding assets for longer periods of time, perform relatively poorly when buying and selling and are strongly associated with price instability in their targeted areas. The presence of these unsophisticated speculators and positive feedback trading contribute the first pieces of evidence from the housing market to a growing body of work in other financial markets that questions whether speculators always act to stabilize prices.
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Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends non-monotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first-price auctions with free entry for bridge-building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.
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The one-shot nature of most theoretical models of strategic investment, especially those based on asymmetric information, limits our ability to test whether they can fit the data. We develop a dynamic version of the classic Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model of limit pricing, where a monopolist incumbent has incentives to repeatedly signal information about its costs to a potential entrant by setting prices below monopoly levels. The model has a unique Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium under a standard form of refinement, and equilibrium strategies can be computed easily, making it well suited for empirical work. We provide reduced-form evidence that our model can explain why incumbent airlines cut prices when Southwest becomes a potential entrant into airport-pair route markets, and we also calibrate our model to show that it can generate the large price declines that are observed in the data.
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Historical anecdotes of new investors being drawn into a booming asset market, only to suffer when the market turns, abound. While the role of investor contagion in asset bubbles has been explored extensively in the theoretical literature, causal empirical evidence on the topic is virtually non-existent. This paper studies the recent boom and bust in the U.S. housing market, establishing that many novice investors entered the market as a direct result of observing investing activity of multiple forms in their own neighborhoods and that these "infected" investors performed poorly relative to other investors along several dimensions.
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Function spaces --- Metric spaces --- Functional analysis --- Espaces fonctionnels --- Espaces métriques --- Espaces vectoriels topologiques --- Linear topological spaces
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This book presents a theory motivated by the spaces LP, 0 ≤ p < l. These spaces are not locally convex, so the methods usually encountered in linear analysis (particularly the Hahn-Banach theorem) do not apply here. Questions about the size of the dual space are especially important in the non-locally convex setting, and are a central theme. Several of the classical problems in the area have been settled in the last decade, and a number of their solutions are presented here. The book begins with concrete examples (lp, LP, L0, HP) before going on to general results and important counterexamples. An F-space sampler will be of interest to research mathematicians and graduate students in functional analysis.
Function spaces. --- Metric spaces. --- Spaces, Metric --- Generalized spaces --- Set theory --- Topology --- Spaces, Function --- Functional analysis
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