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Christology

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Johannes Duns Scotus (1266-1308) was one of the greatest medieval theologians. He joined the Franciscan order and soon stood out because of his acumen. The ideas he developed about the non-necessity of reality became very influential, also in Reformed theology. The life of Duns Scotus is difficult to reconstruct. This biography provides an overview of the state of research and therefore of the life of Duns in his native Scotland, England, where he was educated, France, where he taught, and Germany, where he died.

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In this volume, Antonie Vos offers a comprehensive analysis of the philosophy and theological thought of John Duns Scotus. First, a summary is given of the life and times of John Duns Scotus: his background and years in Oxford (12-80-1301), his time in Paris and Cologne (1308-1309) and his year in exile in Oxford and Cambridge (1303-1304). From there on, Scotus' Trinitarian theology and Christology are introduced. Duns not only embraced the doctrine of the Trinity, he also proved that God must be Trinitarian by connecting the first Person with knowledge to the second One with will. Further insights of Scotus' are discussed, such as the theory of Creation, ethics, justification and predestination, and the sacraments. The volume concludes with an overview of historical dilemmas in Scotus' theological thought.

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Deze thesis onderzoekt de opvattingen van Duns Scotus (1265-1308) over de noodzakelijkheid van de openbaring. Deze opvattingen zijn te vinden in de inleidingen van Scotus' commentaar op de Sententiae, waarvan er drie versies bestaan: de Oxford Lectura (1298-1300), de Oxford Ordinatio (1300-1302, met talrijke revisies) en de Parijse Reportata (1302-1304). Zowel de Lectura als de Ordinatio behandelen het probleem van de openbaring, in tegenstelling tot de Reportata, waarin meer theologische kwesties central staan. De thesis onderzoekt de historische en doctrinele betekenis van de noodzakelijkheidskwestie en verklaart waarom Scotus haar later terzijde schuift. Terwijl Scotus de Ordiniatio schrijft, groeit bij hem het besef dat de al dan niet noodzakelijkheid van de openbaring niet door de natuurlijke rede kan worden bewezen. De annotaties bij de proloog van de Ordinatio bieden hiervan een overtuigend bewijs. Deze omissie is filosofisch relevant, aangezien ze aantoont dat Scotus' doctrine over de relatie tussen geloof en rede aan ontwikkeling onderhevig is. Terwijl hij het probleem aanvankelijk tracht te rationaliseren, geeft Scotus in zijn latere werk het rationalisatieproject op. Scotus' opvattingen over geloof en rede zijn daarom niet eenduidig weer te geven. This thesis examines the question in John Duns Scotus' (1265-1308) prologue to his Sentences commentary on the necessity of supernatural revelation for man in this life. It is part of his prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. There are three versions of Scotus' Sentences commentary: the Oxford Lectura version (1298-1300), on which is based the Oxford Ordinatio version (1300-1302, ongoing revision), and the Parisian Reportata (1302-1304). Both the Lectura and the Ordinatio versions contain the question on the necessity of revelation. The Ordinatio has an annexed second question on the sufficiency of Sacred Scripture to provide those supernatural truths that are required by man in this life. The Reportata prologue does not question the necessity of the theology; it is focused on the subject of theology. My thesis attempts to examine the historical and doctrinal significance of the necessity-question, and to explain why Scotus abandoned it after the Ordinatio. My conclusion is that the Lectura version is rather conventional, but that during composition of the Ordinatio, Scotus realized that revelation could not be concluded to be necessary according to natural reason. Hence he withdrew the question when composing the Reportata version. I provide evidence on the basis of his annotations to the Ordinatio prologue that he thought his Ordinatio arguments were insufficient. This abandonment is philosophically significant, as one must recast the conventional account of Scotus' view of the relation between faith and reason; instead of having one set doctrine on the matter, Scotus tries to rationalize the need for theology, and then retreats from this attempted rationalization. So no simple account can be given of his view of the relation between faith and reason. I present four hypotheses of specific instances of doctrinal change that could have occasioned Scotus' abandonment of Ord. prol. pt. 1 when he went to Paris. These four hypotheses have proceeded from the general hypothesis that in Ord. prol. pt. 1, Scotus was attempting to construct a foundational proof for the necessity of revelation (that is, that the necessity of revelation is demonstrable by natural reason to a non-believer). His proof of the necessity of revelation was to be a foundational proof, and Scotus' treatment was anthropocentric in its orientation. Afterward, the Reportata prologue does not proceed by grounding the Sentences commentary on a foundational and anthropocentric basis. Inasmuch it grounds the theological project, this is done in terms of the subject of God' own absolute conception of theology, and from Scotus' account of this, theology as had by the viator is then developed. This theocentric orientation precludes a foundational proof of the necessity of revelation by natural reason. The first hypothesis proposed that Scotus realised that, according to his own conception of the power of God and the contingency of creation, the necessity of revelation was only necessary in a qualified manner. Indeed, de potentia absoluta, God could have set any conditions for the salvation of the viator. These possible arrangements include one where the viator would merit beatitude in such a way that human nature as such automatically merited salvation. Thus, according to the first hypothesis, the necessity of revelation is necessary only relative to the contingent divine acceptatio. Therefore, because of an implication of Scotus' own doctrinal distinction between the absolute and the ordained power of God, and his philosophy of contingency, he could not argue for the necessity of revelation. I conclude that the origin of this hypothesis could be securely located in Scotus' first treatment of the issue of why it is necessary to posit infused charity in the viator in Ord. Bk. 1, D. 17, pt. 1. The second hypothesis is that Scotus had a doctrinal difficulty concerning Ord. prol. pt. 1 due to his commitment to holding that the viator must have acquired faith in the creed and infused in order to be saved, but that the presence of infused faith cannot be proved by natural reason, nor can it be proved by natural reason that infused faith is necessary for salvation. Acquired faith in the creed cannot be proved to be necessary because it is required to receive the sacraments, and thus obtain the infused habits, because the existence and necessity of the infused habits cannot be known by faith. It also cannot be proved that acquired faith is necessary because one must know the creed to know the acceptatio and via that, to be able to attain beatitude. Yet the fact that acquired faith in the creed is necessary is only disclosed by revelation. It is not known by natural reason. It is therefore not possible to prove that acquired faith is necessary for salvation. I consider this to be a rather good hypothesis, well attested by annotations, and also best represented and most likely to have been occasioned by Ord. Bk. 1, D. 17, pt. 1 or Theoremata pt. 5. Because Ord. Bk. 1, D. 17, pt. 1 can be firmly established as having been composed prior to the Reportata prologue, it is better evidence than Theoremata pt. 5, the date for which has not been determined. The third hypothesis is that Scotus realised that the Ord. prol. pt. 1 argument was defective insofar as it begged the question. One cannot prove by natural reason that certain Catholic dogmas are necessary for beatitude, but that these dogmas cannot be known by natural reason, and, as a result, that revelation is necessary to make them known to the viator. The problem is that one cannot establish by means of natural reason the truth of dogmas unknowable by natural reason, nor their need to be known. I indicate that the text best representing the doctrinal problems causing difficulties for Scotus' foundational project was Ord. Bk. 1, D. 17, pt. 1. I suggest that the first three hypotheses could be combined to give a doctrinal ensemble that explains the majority of the annotations found in Ord. prol. pt. 1, and makes sense of why Scotus would decide to abandon the foundational project of attempting to prove the necessity of revelation by natural reason. The doctrinal ensemble has Scotus' philosophy of contingency at its heart, and its relationship to the divine acceptatio and the natural knowledge of the viator in relation to certain dogmas of the Catholic faith. Scotus holds (on dogmatic grounds) that God creates freely and contingently, and that any necessities in creation only obtain relative to a given order that God has freely instituted. These three hypotheses are first explained in Ord. Bk. 1, D. 17, pt. 1 and it is only there that Scotus sets out the doctrines comprising the three hypotheses in terms that strongly resemble the three hypotheses. The fourth hypothesis is that Scotus' epistemology as set out in Sent. Bk. 1, D. 3 which might have instigated Scotus' change of position on the foundational project of Ord. prol. pt. 1. In Lect. Bk. 1, D. 3, pt. 1, q. 1-2 and the base text of Ord. Bk. 1, D. 3, pt. 1, q. 3, Scotus thought that he had validated this epistemology, in that he thought he had proved by natural reason that the first per se adequate object of the intellect is being, and not quiddities of sensible things. If Scotus' account of the first per se adequate object is accepted, one can argue that the intellect of the viator cannot be perfected in this life, nor in any natural science. As a result, one can argue that beatitude will only occur in the next life. Scotus is therefore in a position to use his acceptance of the Aristotelian theory of cognition as a description of the viator to refute certain arguments of the philosophers in Ord. prol. pt. 1 that conclude that revelation is unnecessary, without allowing for a beatitude in this life. The fourth hypothesis is that Scotus comes to realise there are two difficulties with this epistemology. First, his explanation for why our cognition is limited to cognition of concepts abstracted from the quiddities of sensible things in this life is merely that we have a certain status as a viator, and this status amounts to being a pure effect of God's will, and hence underivable by natural reason. This cannot be proved by natural reason. The second difficulty is that he cannot prove that the first per se adequate object of the intellect is beyond the quiddities of sensible things. If the first per se adequate object is restricted to the quiddities of sensible things then it would not be within the nature of our intellect to cognise God face to face. Yet Scotus needs to prove that we can naturally cognise God face to face, in order to argue that we cannot attain beatitude in this life by nature (e.g. in a science such as metaphysics), but must attain it in the next life. Revelation gives us the means to cooperate with God and thereby position ourselves for this beatitude in the next life. Scotus proceeds to refute the philosopher's claim that we have the possibility of beatific knowledge of separate substances because our cognition is restricted to concepts derived from quiddities of material things. From these, according to the philosophers, we move by quia proofs to separate substances and the knowledge we obtain of the highest substances will perfect our intellect, and it will be knowledge perfective of our intellect and will therefore be beatific. In response, Scotus argues that the first per se adequate object of our intellect is beyond quiddities of sensible things, and hence the intellect cannot be perfected in this life because of our cognitive limitations. Yet the restriction of cognition via the quiddities of sensible things in this life is not 'explained' by our having a certain 'status', viz. the status of being a viator. Indeed, the concept of 'status' is explained, and is merely a shorthand for God's contingent arrangement of the general laws governing our cognition. That God has so contingently willed us to have certain cognitive restrictions in this life (as a result, perhaps, of the fall) cannot be proved to philosophers. This problem is an equivalent in epistemology to the problem of the contingency of the divine acceptatio - the status we have and Scotus' explanation of it cannot be known by natural reason. Another problem caused by Scotus' epistemology for his proof of the necessity of revelation concerns his ability to secure the principle that there is some imperfection in human cognition in this life, and the capacity to argue for the truth of this principle by natural reason. Yet, if his account of why we have an imperfect cognition in this life fails because he cannot prove that the first adequate object transcends quiddities of sensible things, he needs to find another reason why beatitude would consist in a perfect cognition of the first separate substance (God) and yet is impossible in this life (as he noted in an annotation to Ord. prol. pt. 1). The background explanation for why we have a limited and imperfect cognition of God in this life (and therefore require revelation) turns out to be merely the contingent will of God. Because of this, any imperfection of our cognition in this life (and, accordingly our need of revelation) is only a necessity de potentia ordinata, and not de potentia absoluta. Such a state of affairs cannot be demonstrated by natural reason - the situation for our epistemic abilities is analogous to our situation with regard to the necessity of revelation as related to the contingent acceptatio - both are ultimately contingent and not necessary without qualification, and neither can be proved by natural reason. Deze thesis onderzoekt de opvattingen van Duns Scotus (1265-1308) over de noodzakelijkheid van de openbaring. Deze opvattingen zijn te vinden in de inleidingen van Scotus' commentaar op de Sententiae, waarvan er drie versies bestaan: de Oxford Lectura (1298-1300), de Oxford Ordinatio (1300-1302, met talrijke revisies) en de Parijse Reportata (1302-1304). Zowel de Lectura als de Ordinatio behandelen het probleem van de openbaring, in tegenstelling tot de Reportata, waarin meer theologische kwesties central staan. De thesis onderzoekt de historische en doctrinele betekenis van de noodzakelijkheidskwestie en verklaart waarom Scotus haar later terzijde schuift. Terwijl Scotus de Ordiniatio schrijft, groeit bij hem het besef dat de al dan niet noodzakelijkheid van de openbaring niet door de natuurlijke rede kan worden bewezen. De annotaties bij de proloog van de Ordinatio bieden hiervan een overtuigend bewijs. Deze omissie is filosofisch relevant, aangezien ze aantoont dat Scotus' doctrine over de relatie tussen geloof en rede aan ontwikkeling onderhevig is. Terwijl hij het probleem aanvankelijk tracht te rationaliseren, geeft Scotus in zijn latere werk het rationalisatieproject op. Scotus' opvattingen over geloof en rede zijn daarom niet eenduidig weer te geven. My thesis examines the question in John Duns Scotus' (1265-1308) prologue to his Sentences commentary on the necessity of supernatural revelation for man in this life. It is part of his prologue to his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Such commentaries were the major vehicle for discussion of philosophy and theology in the middle ages (and also the way of getting a doctorate in theology in the medieval university). There are three versions of Scotus' Sentences commentary: the Oxford Lectura version (1298-1300), on which is based the Oxford Ordinatio version (1300-1302, ongoing revision), and the Parisian Reportata (1302-1304). Both the Lectura and the Ordinatio versions contain the question on the necessity of revelation. The Ordinatio has an annexed second question on the sufficiency of Sacred Scripture to provide those supernatural truths that are required by man in this life. The Reportata prologue does not question the necessity of the theology; it is focused on the subject of theology. My thesis attempts to examine the historical and doctrinal significance of the necessity-question, and to explain why Scotus abandoned it after the Ordinatio. My conclusion is that the Lectura version is rather conventional, but that during composition of the Ordinatio, Scotus realized that revelation could not be concluded to be necessary according to natural reason. Hence he withdrew the question when composing the Reportata version. I provide evidence on the basis of his annotations to the Ordinatio prologue that he thought his Ordinatio arguments were insufficient. This abandonment is philosophically significant, as one must recast the conventional account of Scotus' view of the relation between faith and reason; instead of having one set doctrine on the matter, Scotus tries to rationalize the need for theology, and then retreats from this attempted rationalization. So no simple account can be given of his view of the relation between faith and reason.