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A lot of economic problems can formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions. Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories. The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who were seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking for effective mathematical tools for their researchers. Members of the editorial board of this series consists of following prominent economists and mathematicians: Managing Editors: S. Kusuoka (Univ. Tokyo), A. Yamazaki (Hitotsubashi Univ.) - Editors: R. Anderson (U.C.Berkeley), C. Castaing (Univ. Montpellier II), F. H. Clarke (Univ. Lyon I), E. Dierker (Univ. Vienna), D. Duffie (Stanford Univ.), L.C. Evans (U.C. Berkeley), T. Fujimoto (Fukuoka Univ.), J. -M. Grandmont (CREST-CNRS), N. Hirano (Yokohama National Univ.), L. Hurwicz (Univ. of Minnesota), T. Ichiishi (Hitotsubashi Univ.), A. Ioffe (Israel Institute of Technology), S. Iwamoto (Kyushu Univ.), K. Kamiya (Univ. Tokyo), K. Kawamata (Keio Univ.), N. Kikuchi (Keio Univ.), T. Maruyama (Keio Univ.), H. Matano (Univ. Tokyo), K. Nishimura (Kyoto Univ.), M. K. Richter (Univ. Minnesota), Y. Takahashi (Kyoto Univ.), M. Valadier (Univ. Montpellier II), M. Yano (Keio Univ).
Economics, Mathematical. --- Economics --- Mathematical economics --- Econometrics --- Mathematics --- Methodology --- Economic theory. --- Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods. --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man
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This is the very first comprehensive monograph in a burgeoning, new research area - the theory of cooperative game with incomplete information with emphasis on the solution concept of Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium that encompasses the concept of the Bayesian incentive compatible core. Built upon the concepts and techniques in the classical static cooperative game theory and in the non-cooperative Bayesian game theory, the theory constructs and analyzes in part the powerful n-person game-theoretical model characterized by coordinated strategy-choice with individualistic ince
Game theory --- Bayesian statistical decision theory --- Bayesian statistical decision theory. --- Game theory. --- Bayes' solution --- Bayesian analysis --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Statistical decision --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics
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Quantitative methods (economics) --- Economic schools --- Financial analysis --- economisch denken --- financiële analyse
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A lot of economic problems can formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions. Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories. The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who were seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking for effective mathematical tools for their researchers.
Listing 1 - 10 of 15 | << page >> |
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