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"L'essor de la Chine ne date pas d'hier. Les inquiétudes qu'il soulève non plus, surtout dans le camp occidental. Mais l'histoire s'accélère depuis une dizaine d'années. Aujourd'hui, les Etats-Unis n'hésitent plus à faire de la Chine leur principal adversaire stratégique. Ailleurs, et en particulier dans les pays du Sud, les réactions sont plus contrastées. En effet, la Chine a beau être devenue une puissance capitaliste de premier plan, elle joue selon des règles qui diffèrent de celles que suivent les Occidentaux. Pour le meilleur ... comme pour le pire. Analyser l'essor international de la Chine sous le seul angle de la "menace" se révèle donc doublement trompeur. D'abord, parce que celle-ci porte sur un ordre mondial dont les bénéfices historiques sont loin d'avoir été équitablement répartis. Ensuite parce que ce faisant, on sous-estime la pluralité des intérêts et des contradictions qui existe entre la Chine et les autres régions du monde, mais aussi au sein même de la société chinoise."--

Great powers.

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Great powers

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"How do great countries stay that way? The United States is the most powerful actor in the international system, but it is facing a set of challenges that might lead to its decline as this century unfolds. This book looks to the past for guidance, examining the grand strategy of previous superpowers to see how they maintained, or failed to maintain, their status. Over the course of six cases, from Ancient Rome to the British Empire, it seeks guidance from the past for present U.S. policymakers. How did previous empires, regional hegemons, or simply dominant powers forge grand strategy? How did they define their interests, and then assemble the tools to address them? What did they do right, and where did they err? What - if anything - can current U.S. strategists learn from the experience of earlier superpowers?"--

Strategy --- Great powers

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Cold War --- Great powers

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"It is one of the great unexamined assumptions of the realist school of foreign policy that nations cannot know each others' intentions. Scholars outside the realist school, such as Robert Jervis, Michael Doyle or Francis Fukuyama, believe that intentions are knowable at least some of the time. Besides being important for the theory of international relations, this question has huge practical significance: whether the United States and China can find some mutual accommodation in the western Pacific, for instance, depends a great deal on how well each side thinks it knows what the other really plans to do. But no one has rigorously studied the issue. In The Road to Hell, IR scholar Sebastian Rosato looks at four cases in which theorists believe rival nations had faith in each other's benign intentions-- Germany and Russia in the Bismarck era (1871-90); Britain and the United States during the great rapprochement (1895-1905); France and Germany, and Japan and the United States in the early interwar period (1919-32); and the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the Cold War (1985-90)-and shows that in each case, neither nation's leaders had much confidence in the other's, and they constantly pursued heightened security. When any nation lessened its security stance, it was only because it had grown too weak to keep pace with its rival. Rosato concludes with a chapter on what his findings mean for the most important rivalry in the world today, that between the U.S. and China. As the first exercise in testing one of IR's key theoretical assumptions against historical reality, The Road to Hell will make a significant-and controversial-impact on international relations scholarship"--

Balance of power --- Great powers