Listing 1 - 4 of 4 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
L’unification est une stratégie permettant d’encoder des associations en mémoire épisodique en les combinant de sorte qu’elles ne forment plus qu’une seule et même information (Bastin et al., 2013). A ce jour, les processus cognitifs qui sous-tendent ce mécanisme d’unification sont encore mal compris. Ce mémoire avait pour but de tester l’hypothèse selon laquelle le processus d’unification requerrait une imagerie mentale visuelle. Pour répondre à cette question, nous avons recruté une population rapportant ne pas posséder d’imagerie mentale visuelle. Cette condition est nommée aphantasie et a été encore, à l’heure actuelle, très peu étudiée. L’objectif secondaire de ce mémoire sera de déterminer si les individus aphantasiques sont, malgré leur déficit d’imagerie visuelle, capables de mettre en place une stratégie d'unification alternative ne faisant pas appel à l’imagerie visuelle, plus spécifiquement via la sémantisation de l’information à encoder en mémoire épisodique. Nous avons donc administré à 16 sujets aphantasiques ainsi qu’à 32 participants contrôles appariés, trois tâches de mémorisation : (1) une tâche d’unification, (2) une tâche de non-unification et (3) une tâche d’unification abstraite de non-mots. Dans l’hypothèse où l’imagerie mentale visuelle serait bien nécessaire au processus d’unification, les participants aphantasiques éprouveraient alors des difficultés d’unification, évaluées via la contribution de la familiarité, et plus spécifiquement le taux de bonnes réponses y associées, lors des tâches administrées. A l’issue de ce travail, nous n’avons pu démontrer une utilisation différenciée de la familiarité entre la tâche d’unification et de non-unification, contrairement à nos attentes. Ces résultats évoquent deux possibilités : (1) soit nos résultats ne nous permettent pas de déduire les composantes du processus d’unification puisque celui-ci n’a potentiellement pas eu lieu, (2) soit nos résultats ne permettent pas de démontrer la nécessité ou la contribution unique de l’imagerie mentale visuelle au sein du processus d’unification. Il convient de mentionner que certains aspects de la méthodologie pourraient avoir influencé les résultats et que les résultats laissent à suggérer des processus de nature compensatoire mis en place par les aphantasiques. En effet, l’aphantasie étant encore une condition peu étudiée et étant de nature très subjective, il conviendra dans les futures études d’appréhender de manière plus précise et objective l’aphantasie et ses implications sur le plan cognitif afin d’améliorer la poursuite des études à ce propos.
Aphantasia --- Episodic memory --- Visual imagery --- Unitization --- Unification --- Imagerie mentale visuelle --- Aphantasie --- Mémoire épisodique --- Sciences sociales & comportementales, psychologie > Neurosciences & comportement
Choose an application
Today in many studies, mental images are still either treated as conscious by definition, or as empirical operations implicit to completing some type of task, such as the measurement of reaction time in mental rotation, an underlying mental image is assumed, but there is no direct determination of whether it is conscious or not. The vividness of mental images is a potentially helpful construct which may be suitable, as it may correspond to consciousness or aspects of the consciousness of images. In this context, a complicating factor seems to be the surprising variety in what is meant by the term vividness or how it is used or theorized. To fill some of the gaps, the goal of the present Special Issue is to create a publication outlet where authors can fully explore through sound research the missing theoretical and empirical links between vividness, consciousness and mental imagery across disciplines, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, to mention the most obvious ones, as well as transdisciplinary methodological (single, combined, or multiple) approaches.
Psychology --- vividness --- mental imagery --- consciousness --- cognitive neuroscience --- neuroimaging --- cognitive psychology --- behavior --- verbal report --- phenomenology --- perception --- DMN --- TPN --- familiarity --- memory --- amodal completion --- shape perception --- perceptual organization --- depth perception --- visual illusions --- color-gustatory synesthesia --- taste --- taste modulator --- synesthesia --- bibliometrics --- map of science --- term co-occurrence --- contrast polarity --- simplicity principle --- likelihood principle --- simplicity–likelihood equivalence --- Bayes --- classical information theory --- modern information theory --- Bayes’ framework --- visual imagery --- stroke --- posterior cerebral artery --- aphantasia --- prosopagnosia --- visual perception --- n/a --- simplicity-likelihood equivalence --- Bayes' framework
Choose an application
Today in many studies, mental images are still either treated as conscious by definition, or as empirical operations implicit to completing some type of task, such as the measurement of reaction time in mental rotation, an underlying mental image is assumed, but there is no direct determination of whether it is conscious or not. The vividness of mental images is a potentially helpful construct which may be suitable, as it may correspond to consciousness or aspects of the consciousness of images. In this context, a complicating factor seems to be the surprising variety in what is meant by the term vividness or how it is used or theorized. To fill some of the gaps, the goal of the present Special Issue is to create a publication outlet where authors can fully explore through sound research the missing theoretical and empirical links between vividness, consciousness and mental imagery across disciplines, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, to mention the most obvious ones, as well as transdisciplinary methodological (single, combined, or multiple) approaches.
Psychology --- vividness --- mental imagery --- consciousness --- cognitive neuroscience --- neuroimaging --- cognitive psychology --- behavior --- verbal report --- phenomenology --- perception --- DMN --- TPN --- familiarity --- memory --- amodal completion --- shape perception --- perceptual organization --- depth perception --- visual illusions --- color-gustatory synesthesia --- taste --- taste modulator --- synesthesia --- bibliometrics --- map of science --- term co-occurrence --- contrast polarity --- simplicity principle --- likelihood principle --- simplicity–likelihood equivalence --- Bayes --- classical information theory --- modern information theory --- Bayes’ framework --- visual imagery --- stroke --- posterior cerebral artery --- aphantasia --- prosopagnosia --- visual perception --- n/a --- simplicity-likelihood equivalence --- Bayes' framework
Choose an application
Today in many studies, mental images are still either treated as conscious by definition, or as empirical operations implicit to completing some type of task, such as the measurement of reaction time in mental rotation, an underlying mental image is assumed, but there is no direct determination of whether it is conscious or not. The vividness of mental images is a potentially helpful construct which may be suitable, as it may correspond to consciousness or aspects of the consciousness of images. In this context, a complicating factor seems to be the surprising variety in what is meant by the term vividness or how it is used or theorized. To fill some of the gaps, the goal of the present Special Issue is to create a publication outlet where authors can fully explore through sound research the missing theoretical and empirical links between vividness, consciousness and mental imagery across disciplines, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, cognitive science, to mention the most obvious ones, as well as transdisciplinary methodological (single, combined, or multiple) approaches.
vividness --- mental imagery --- consciousness --- cognitive neuroscience --- neuroimaging --- cognitive psychology --- behavior --- verbal report --- phenomenology --- perception --- DMN --- TPN --- familiarity --- memory --- amodal completion --- shape perception --- perceptual organization --- depth perception --- visual illusions --- color-gustatory synesthesia --- taste --- taste modulator --- synesthesia --- bibliometrics --- map of science --- term co-occurrence --- contrast polarity --- simplicity principle --- likelihood principle --- simplicity–likelihood equivalence --- Bayes --- classical information theory --- modern information theory --- Bayes’ framework --- visual imagery --- stroke --- posterior cerebral artery --- aphantasia --- prosopagnosia --- visual perception --- n/a --- simplicity-likelihood equivalence --- Bayes' framework
Listing 1 - 4 of 4 |
Sort by
|