Listing 1 - 10 of 23 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience "overspending," "undertaxing," "overborrowing," and "overinflation" unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyzes reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints.
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Deposit insurance --- Bank insurance --- Bank insurance. --- Deposit insurance. --- United States.
Choose an application
Deposit insurance --- Bank insurance --- Bank insurance. --- Deposit insurance. --- United States.
Choose an application
Deposit insurance --- Bank insurance --- Bank insurance. --- Deposit insurance. --- United States.
Choose an application
Bank protection --- Checks --- Forgery --- Bank insurance
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Germany's private deposit insurance scheme with its "clublike" nature, cannot easily be transplanted to countries with weaker institutions. But it offers useful lessons for countries that want to set up a new scheme or reform an existing one.
Listing 1 - 10 of 23 | << page >> |
Sort by
|