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Billings and Collections Best Practices offers advice for implementing a plethora of best practices to greatly improve your company's level of efficiency in information reporting, including:Showing you how to create a more efficient billing operation.Demonstrating how you can reduce the error rate on bills sent to customers. Revealing specific steps for you to reduce the amount of outstanding receivables. Providing guidelines on how you can restructure invoice formats to shorten the payment interval.Detailing how to create a database for recurring billings and ho

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Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? In the late 1980s, Chile planned to privatize Santiago's sanitary works enterprise (EMOS) but instead reformed it under public ownership. It did so through a regulatory framework that mimicked the design of a concession with a private utility, setting tariffs that ensured at least a 7 percent return on assets, creating a neutral regulator independent of ministry intervention, and giving EMOS the right to appeal the regulator's tariff decisions. This reform of Santiago's water system is often cited as a case of successful reform under public management. Comparing a comprehensive measure of welfare with a counterfactual example, Shirley, Xu, and Zuluaga show surprisingly large gains from Santiago's reform, given the relatively good initial conditions. (The gains accrued largely to government and employees, but consumers benefited from improved service and coverage.) Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? Chile has a long tradition of private water rights, shaped by early recognition that water is a scarce and tradable private good; The reformed regulatory framework was designed to attract private investors to the water system and to motivate them to operate efficiently and expand the system; Chile's unique electoral institutions sustained this framework under state operation after democracy was restored; Chile's strong bureaucratic norms and institutions (permitting little corruption), combined with Santiago's relatively low-cost water system, permitted prices that effectively increased quasi-rents for investing in the system while minimizing the risk of inefficiency or monopoly rents. The authors also address the question of why EMOS was reformed but not privatized, and what the costs of not privatizing were. The system was privatized in 1999, but the changes from privatization are likely to be less significant than those introduced in 1989-90. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to draw lessons from regulatory reform and understand political and institutional change. This study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Competition and Privatization in Urban Water Supply (RPO 682-64). Mary Shirley may be contacted at mshirley@worldbank.org.

Bill Collection --- Cubic Meters --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Industry --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Number Of Connections --- Price Of Water --- Private Participation in Infrastructure --- Private Sector Development --- Private Utility --- Public Works --- Sewage Treatment --- Sewerage Services --- Tariff Decisions --- Tariff Setting --- Tariff Setting Process --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban Water --- Urban Water Supply --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water and Industry --- Water Companies --- Water Conservation --- Water Consumption --- Water Resources --- Water Sector --- Water Services --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Supply and Systems --- Water System --- Water Systems --- Water Tariffs