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The impact of micro-credit interventions on existing credit markets is theoretically ambiguous. Previous empirical work suggests the entry of a joint-liability lender may lead to a positive impact on the informal lending rate. This paper presents the first randomized controlled trial-based evidence on this question. Households in rural Bihar, India, were offered low-cost credit through a government-led self-help group program, the rollout of which was randomized at the panchayat level. The intervention led to a dramatic 14.5 percent decline in the use of informal credit, as households substituted to lower-cost self-help group loans. Due to the program, the average rate paid on recent loans fell from 69 to 58 percent per year overall. Rates on informal loans also declined slightly. Among landless households, informal lending rates fell from 65.5 to 63.2 percent, decreasing by 40 percent the gap in rates paid by landless versus landowning households. Two years after the initiation of the program, significant positive impacts on asset ownership among landless households were apparent. Impacts on various indicators of women's empowerment were mixed, and showed no clear direction when aggregated, nor was there any impact on consumption expenditures.

Micro-Credit --- Rural Credit Markets --- Self-Help Groups

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Tales of Peasants, Traders, and Officials: Contracting in Rural Andhra Pradesh, 1980-82 stems from a research project in the subfield of rural economic organization, with a focus on credit and irrigation, and on how public policy in these domains influenced agricultural development. The fieldwork was carried out in three states of the Indian Union between 1980 to 1982, including 14 villages in Andhra Pradesh. The survey covered villagers' dealings in the markets for labor, tenancies, credit, and crops. It revealed not only diverse contractual forms in those markets, but also their interplay with access to credit and its terms. Understanding what motivates agents to contract in a particular way-or not at all-is essential in such a study. At the beginning and toward the close of the survey work, the principal investigators conducted interviews with focus groups, some respondents in the household sample, and various public officials, who were encouraged to speak freely. The first part of the monograph comprises an introductory chapter and two long travelogues, which provide structured accounts of the proceedings of those interviews. Next are formal analyses of various alternative contractual arrangements and the villagers' choices among them. These are partly inductive; they draw on what respondents had to say about their options and decisions as well as received theory. Four topics are treated in detail: (1) the choice between employment as a casual laborer and as an attached farm servant; (2) the choice between sharecropping and fixed-rents paid in kind, with special reference to land irrigated by percolation wells; (3) the closely related matter of loans, subsidies, and corruption in connection with the profitability of investments in wells; and (4) the tying of loans for the cultivation of commercial crops to the arrangements for marketing them. The central importance of villagers' outside options and access to credit emerges clearly.

Credit --- Interlinked contracts --- Irrigation --- Marketing --- Rural credit markets --- Rural labor --- Tenancy

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Subnational insolvency is a reoccurring event in development, as demonstrated by historical and modern episodes of subnational defaults in both developed and developing countries. Insolvency procedures become more important as countries decentralize expenditure, taxation, and borrowing, and broaden subnational credit markets. As the first cross-country survey of procedures to resolve subnational financial distress, this paper has particular relevance for decentralizing countries. The authors explain central features and variations of subnational insolvency mechanisms across countries. They identify judicial, administrative, and hybrid procedures, and show how entry point and political factors drive their design. Like private insolvency law, subnational insolvency procedures predictably allocate default risk, while providing breathing space for orderly debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment. Policymakers' desire to mitigate the tension between creditor rights and the need to maintain essential public services, to strengthen ex ante fiscal rules, and to harden subnational budget constraints are motivations specific to the public sector.

Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Credit markets --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Debt restructuring --- Defaults --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial distress --- Insolvency --- Insolvency law --- Insolvency mechanisms --- Insolvency procedures --- Public Disclosure --- Strategic Debt Management

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Using a new and representative data set of Chinese household finance, this paper documents household access to and costs of finance, along with their correlates. As in most developing countries, informal finance is a crucial element of household finance, and wealth tends to be associated with better access to formal and informal finance. Better financial knowledge shifts loan portfolios toward formal sources relative to informal ones. Connections to the Communist Party are associated with significantly better access to finance in rural areas but not in urban areas. A larger social network is positively associated with access to informal finance. Controlling for household characteristics, rural residents pay interest rates on loans similar to urban residents. Younger residents pay higher rates, while households on firmer economic footing face lower rates. Taking financial classes and college education is associated with higher interest rates for urban residents, suggesting perhaps that financial knowledge coincides with greater demand for credit in areas with more economic opportunity. Overall, the findings suggest that Chinese residents face dual credit markets, with the poor, young, those with poor financial knowledge, and those with larger family sizes relying much more on informal finance, while others are better able to access formal finance.

Access to finance --- Bankruptcy and resolution of financial distress --- Banks and banking reform --- Costs of finance --- Debt markets --- Dual credit markets --- Finance and financial sector development --- Financial knowledge --- Financial literacy --- Household finance --- Political connections

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How do borrowers respond to improvements in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a unique identification system is absent. Fingerprinting allows the lender to more effectively use dynamic repayment incentives: withholding future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example, less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended use on the cash crop).

Access to credit --- Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Borrower --- Collateral --- Credit market --- Credit markets --- Debt Markets --- Defaulters --- Economic Theory & Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Information asymmetries --- International bank --- Lender --- Lenders --- Loan --- Loan sizes --- Loan terms --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Microfinance --- Moral hazard --- Profitability --- Public policy --- Repayment --- Repayment rates --- Rural credit