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The Department of Defense (DoD) argues that it needs to maintain a high level of readiness across the joint force so that it can remain highly responsive. In this report, the author conducts a historical analysis to identify the demand for responsiveness in past U.S. operations. This historical analysis demonstrates that U.S. forces have been called on to rapidly respond to crises many times since 1950 and that responsiveness was important—to varying degrees—to achieving the United States' political aims in all but one of the cases examined. Moreover, the U.S. military has routinely been called on to carry out multiple operations simultaneously. Going forward, the United States must consider the balance between readiness for smaller-scale crisis response operations and being prepared to deter and defeat a great power in major combat. It is not clear that the U.S. military can continue to try to do everything. This historical analysis cannot specify the exact level of readiness that the joint force should maintain. But it does suggest that the United States has demanded a relatively ready military since World War II and that if the American people and American policymakers continue to expect their military to be able to quickly respond to events anywhere in the world, maintaining a relatively high level of readiness will be necessary.

Military readiness --- Operational readiness (Military science) --- Armements --- État de préparation opérationnelle (Science militaire) --- History. --- Histoire. --- United States --- United States. --- Armed Forces --- Operational readiness.

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"Armed conflict has declined in both frequency and intensity since the end of the Cold War. The trends are especially clear for interstate conflict, but they also hold true for intrastate conflict. Taking into account historical trends and projections of key conflict drivers, the interstate and intrastate baseline future conflict projections in this report depict a continued decline through 2040, with interstate conflict down to extremely low levels and a much lower incidence of intrastate conflict. Some divergence from these projections is likely. The three factors that most strongly increased interstate conflict expectations were declining U.S. preeminence, declining capabilities of international organizations, and declining prevalence of consolidated democracies. The incidence of intrastate conflict is expected to increase if the capacity of state institutions or the rate of economic growth declines. Although the authors' projections indicate that interstate conflict may be rare in the future, the United States must retain a ready and credible land power deterrent to ensure such a future. Such a deterrent might not be used frequently, but its very existence delays the rise of a challenger and has a dampening effect on the incidence of conflict. The authors' projections also indicate that intrastate conflict (including proxy wars) will continue to be the main form of conflict incidence and, given the U.S. position in the international state system, Army forces are likely to become engaged in such conflicts. The trends toward a decrease in conflict incidence do not necessarily mean fewer U.S. interventions"--Publisher's web site

War --- Guerre --- History --- Research. --- Forecasting. --- Histoire --- Recherche. --- Prévision. --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Operational readiness. --- État de préparation opérationnelle. --- United States --- Military policy.

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Asked by the Air Force Materiel Command to determine whether the efficacy of existing and future acquisition programs and strategies could be improved, RAND's Project AIR FORCE engaged a team of experts to analyze U.S. Air Force intelligence support to the acquisition community. The main challenge they found is in ensuring the ability of the acquisition community to deliver capabilities that meet a threat as it exists when capabilities are delivered, not as it was when requirements were set. Doing so requires understanding the distinct cultures, resource constraints and incentives, and goals of the acquisition and intelligence enterprises themselves, all of which have been shaped during decades when the U.S. military dominated and its weaponry had no peer. Thus, the authors provide an overview of the acquisition enterprise ecosystem, which includes the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, as well as Congress and other stakeholders. Focusing on interactions between acquisition and intelligence processes and personnel, including current disincentives to interacting, and taking into account resource constraints, they point to ways to enhance information sharing and workforce development in order to ensure that U.S. Air Force acquisition is adequately informed by intelligence in an environment of increasingly sophisticated threats from peer and near-peer adversaries.

Military intelligence --- Service des renseignements militaires --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Procurement. --- Operational readiness --- Planning. --- État de préparation opérationnelle --- Planification.

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To effect reductions in institutional and operational headquarters (HQ), Focus Area Review Group II (FARG II) HQ design was developed and included a new unit type -- the Main Command Post-Operational Detachment (MCP-OD) -- through which reserve component (RC) personnel augment active component (AC) staffs. This report identifies the effects of this design on division HQ readiness and develops potential mitigation strategies. The authors reviewed Army history, doctrine, and force structure documents to define when a division HQ deploys and the missions it might be assigned. They visited several AC divisions to interview participants in a multicomponent HQ and conducted telephone interviews with other units. The authors then analyzed how AC and RC staffs have prepared their combined forces for employment as a single HQ and where their efforts have been challenged. Last, the authors developed a model to illustrate when a division HQ will experience increased risk as it tries to meet requirements.

Military planning --- Deployment (Strategy) --- Planification militaire --- Déploiement (Stratégie) --- United States. --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- United States. --- Organization. --- Operational readiness --- Evaluation. --- État de préparation opérationnelle --- Évaluation. --- United States.

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The Army is introducing a new fitness test for the first time in more than 40 years. The six-event Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT) is designed to (1) ensure soldiers are ready to perform combat tasks, (2) reduce preventable injuries, and (3) promote a culture of fitness throughout the Army. In this report, the authors conduct an independent review of the ACFT and provide recommendations to support the Army's implementation decisions. The RAND research team undertook a multidimensional approach that involved (1) an evaluation of ACFT data gathered by the Army, (2) interviews and discussions with members of the workforce and subject-matter experts, and (3) a review and assessment of ACFT-relevant research, plans, policies, and other guidance. The authors find that the Army's evidence base for the ACFT supports some, but not all, aspects of the test. In particular, some events have not been shown to predict combat task performance or reduce injuries, and justification is needed for why all fitness events and minimum standards apply equally to all soldiers. Relatedly, ACFT scores collected by the Army during the diagnostic phase show some groups failing at noticeably higher rates - the implications of which need to be investigated. Evidence suggests that scores and pass rates can improve with training and that soldiers want more access to the right training and equipment. To address these concerns and because it must continuously monitor the ACFT after its full-scale implementation, the Army should establish a permanent, institutionalized process for overseeing and refining the ACFT.

Physical fitness --- Soldiers --- Condition physique --- Standards --- Testing. --- Training of --- Tests. --- United States. --- États-Unis. --- Rules and practice --- Evaluation. --- Physical training. --- Operational readiness. --- Règlements et procédure --- Évaluation. --- État de préparation opérationnelle.