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Norway has made substantial progress in strengthening its framework for financial crisis management and bank safety nets since the 2015 FSAP. The Norwegian authorities have implemented the EU framework. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has been transposed into the Norwegian legal framework mainly by amendments to the Financial Institutions and Financial Groups Act and accompanying regulations. Finanstilsynet (the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, FSA) has been designated as Norway's resolution authority. Resolution financing options were broadened by establishing a resolution fund. While the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) has yet to be brought into the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, Norway has, in fact, already transposed it into the Norwegian law. This provides the Norwegian authorities with a broadened and detailed regulatory framework for dealing with weak banks.

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Norway has made substantial progress in strengthening its framework for financial crisis management and bank safety nets since the 2015 FSAP. The Norwegian authorities have implemented the EU framework. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) has been transposed into the Norwegian legal framework mainly by amendments to the Financial Institutions and Financial Groups Act and accompanying regulations. Finanstilsynet (the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, FSA) has been designated as Norway's resolution authority. Resolution financing options were broadened by establishing a resolution fund. While the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) has yet to be brought into the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, Norway has, in fact, already transposed it into the Norwegian law. This provides the Norwegian authorities with a broadened and detailed regulatory framework for dealing with weak banks.

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Recent research has provided strong circumstantial evidence for the proposition that sustained deflation -- the result of a mismanaged international gold standard -- was a major cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Less clear is the mechanism by which deflation led to depression. In this paper we consider several channels, including effects operating through real wages and through interest rates. Our focus, however, is on the disruptive effect of deflation on the financial system, particularly the banking system. Theory suggests that falling prices, by reducing the net worth of banks and borrowers, can affect flows of credit and thus real activity. Using annual data for twenty-four countries, we confirm that countries which (for historical or institutional reasons) were more vulnerable to severe banking panics also suffered much worse depressions, as did countries which remained on the gold standard. We also find that there may have been a feedback loop through which banking panics, particularly those in the United States, intensified the worldwide deflation.

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The U.S. authorities should preserve the considerable progress in the resiliency, recoverability, and resolvability of financial companies and insured depository institutions (IDIs), and intensify financial crisis preparedness efforts. After a decade of resolution planning, the development of the U.S. resolution regime is more advanced than in other major economies. This regime, together with the strong track record of the deposit insurance system (DIS) for banks and the federal banking agencies' (FBAs) preparation for resolution, provide a strong foundation for crisis preparedness. Bank holding companies (BHCs) have integrated recovery and resolution planning (RRP) into business-as-usual (BAU) activities, increasing their resiliency; this process has deepened the FBAs' understanding of the BHCs' business models and RRP capabilities. The FBAs should continue their own annual resolution planning and mitigate the recent changes that reduced the BHCs' RRP. These efforts should be complemented by further interagency crisis preparedness, including particularly with the U.S. Department of the Treasury (UST), given its essential role in critical aspects of crisis responses. Finally, further refinements relating to cross-border resolution also deserve attention.

Financial disclosure. --- Crisis management.

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The U.S. authorities should preserve the considerable progress in the resiliency, recoverability, and resolvability of financial companies and insured depository institutions (IDIs), and intensify financial crisis preparedness efforts. After a decade of resolution planning, the development of the U.S. resolution regime is more advanced than in other major economies. This regime, together with the strong track record of the deposit insurance system (DIS) for banks and the federal banking agencies' (FBAs) preparation for resolution, provide a strong foundation for crisis preparedness. Bank holding companies (BHCs) have integrated recovery and resolution planning (RRP) into business-as-usual (BAU) activities, increasing their resiliency; this process has deepened the FBAs' understanding of the BHCs' business models and RRP capabilities. The FBAs should continue their own annual resolution planning and mitigate the recent changes that reduced the BHCs' RRP. These efforts should be complemented by further interagency crisis preparedness, including particularly with the U.S. Department of the Treasury (UST), given its essential role in critical aspects of crisis responses. Finally, further refinements relating to cross-border resolution also deserve attention.

Financial disclosure. --- Crisis management.