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This paper presents an update to the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes on Fiscal Transparency for Greece. The government has initiated steps toward improving auditing. The Ministry of Economy and Finance is undertaking a comparative examination of its auditing mechanism against those used by the European Union (EU) and by other advanced economies. It is also making use of the experience gained through the auditing of programs that are financed jointly by national and EU funds. It is intended that all expenditures would be subject to audit prior to expenditure approval.

Budgeting --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- Budgeting & financial management --- Budget planning and preparation --- Fiscal transparency --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Budget --- Greece

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This study provides a factual report on developments in data dissemination and fiscal transparency since the September 1999 Experimental Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes—Czech Republic and the June 2000 update. The 2001 State Budget was prepared in accordance with the new budgetary rules. According to the new law on budgetary rules, all state guarantees must be approved by way of a special act (law), which means that each individual guarantee must be approved by government as well as by parliament.

Budgeting --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- Budgeting & financial management --- Budget planning and preparation --- Fiscal transparency --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Budget --- Czech Republic

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This technical note focuses on recent developments to the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) on Fiscal Transparency and Data Modules for Sweden. The authorities are implementing recommendations of the fiscal ROSC module. The government has decided to reform the state audit organization (RRV) as recommended by the report. Effective 2003, the RRV will be transformed from a government agency to an audit office under parliament, staffed by independent officials. The authorities are also following up on recommendations regarding data-related standards and codes.

Public Finance --- Data Processing --- Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology --- Computer Programs: General --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Auditing --- Fiscal Policy --- Data capture & analysis --- Public finance & taxation --- Management accounting & bookkeeping --- Macroeconomics --- Data processing --- Fiscal transparency code --- Fiscal transparency --- Fiscal policy --- Economic and financial statistics --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Electronic data processing --- Sweden

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This report evaluates the Observance of Standards and Codes on Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency and Fiscal Transparency for France. Up to mid-2001, different rules were applied to insurance firms regulated by the Insurance Code and to establishments regulated by the Code de la Mutualité. Moving toward the consolidation of these rules, a new Code de la Mutualité was ratified by Parliament in July 2001. Now, prudential rules concerning authorizations for new entrants in the insurance business, technical provision, and solvency margins are the same for all companies in the sector.

Budgeting --- Insurance --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- Insurance Companies --- Actuarial Studies --- Budgeting & financial management --- Insurance & actuarial studies --- Fiscal transparency --- Budget planning and preparation --- Financial institutions --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Budget --- France

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The global surge in independent fiscal councils (IFCs) raises three related questions: How can IFCs improve the conduct of fiscal policy? Are they simultaneously desirable for voters and elected policymakers? And are they resilient to changes in political conditions? We build a model in which voters cannot observe the true competence of elected policymakers. IFCs’ role is to mitigate this imperfection. Equilibrium public debt is excessive because policymakers are “partisan” and “opportunistic.” If voters only care about policymakers’ competence, both the incumbent and the voters would be better off with an IFC as the debt bias would shrink. However, when other considerations eclipse competence and give the incumbent a strong electoral advantage or disadvantage, setting up an IFC may be counterproductive as the debt bias would increase. If the incumbent holds a moderate electoral advantage or disadvantage, voters would prefer an IFC, but an incumbent with a large advantage may prefer not to have an IFC. The main policy implications are that (i) establishing an IFC can only lower the debt bias if voters care sufficiently about policymakers’ competence; (ii) not all political environments are conducive to the emergence of IFCs; and (iii) IFCs are consequently vulnerable to shifts in political conditions.

Fiscal policy. --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Economic policy --- Finance, Public --- Government policy --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Fiscal Policy --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Public finance & taxation --- Fiscal policy --- Public debt --- Fiscal councils --- Fiscal rules --- Fiscal transparency --- Debts, Public --- Netherlands, The