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The paper is about the art of exchange rate management by central banks. It begins by reviewing the diversity of objectives and practices of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. Central banks typically exercise discretion in determining when and to what extent to intervene. Some central banks use publicly declared rules of intervention, with the aim of increasing visibility and strengthening the signaling channel of policy. There is tentative evidence that the volatility of foreign exchange reserves is comparatively lower in emerging market economies where central banks follow some form of rules-based foreign exchange intervention. The paper goes on to argue that when the foreign exchange market includes some large strategic participants, the central bank can achieve superior outcomes if intervention takes the form of a rule, or "schedule," indicating commitments to buying and selling different quantities of foreign currency conditional on the exchange rate. Exchange rate management and reserve management can then be treated as two independent objectives by the central bank. In line with the stylized facts reviewed, this would enable a central bank to pursue exchange rate objectives with minimum reserve changes, or achieve reserve targets with minimum impact on the exchange rate.

Central bank policy --- Foreign exchange intervention --- Intervention rules --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Oligopoly

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There is a renewed debate on the role of exchange rate policies as an industrial policy tool in both academic and policy circles. Policy practitioners usually examine real exchange rate misalignments to monitor the behavior of this key relative price and, if possible, exploit distortions in the traded and non-traded relative price to promote growth. Anecdotal evidence shows that some countries have pursued very active exchange rate policies to promote the export sector and enhance growth by undervaluing their currencies. The main goal of this paper is to provide a systematic characterization of real exchange rate undervaluations. The long-run real exchange rate equation is estimated using: (a) Johansen time series cointegration estimates, and (b) pooled mean group estimates for non-stationary panel data. The paper constructs a dataset of real undervaluation episodes. It first evaluates whether (and if so, to what extent) economic policies can be used to either cause or sustain real undervaluations. In this context the paper empirically models the likelihood and magnitude of sustaining real exchange rate undervaluations by examining their link to policy instruments (such as exchange rate regimes and capital controls, among other policies) using probit and Tobit models. Finally, it investigates whether foreign exchange intervention can generate persistent real exchange rate deviations from equilibrium. In general, it finds that intervention can lead to greater persistence in the incidence and magnitude of real exchange rate undervaluations.

Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Economic Stabilization --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Real Exchange Rate Misalignment --- Undervaluation and Foreign Exchange Intervention

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Using panel data for 15 economies from 2001-12, I identify determinants of central bank foreign exchange intervention in emerging markets (“EMs”) with flexible to moderately managed exchange rates. Similar to other studies, I find that central banks tend to “lean against the wind,” buying/selling more foreign exchange in response to greater short-run and medium-run appreciation/depreciation pressures. The panel structure provides a framework to test whether other macroeconomic variables influence the different rates of reserve accumulation between economies. In testing other variables, I find evidence of both precautionary and external competitiveness motives for reserve accumulation.

Foreign exchange administration. --- Banks and banking --- Foreign exchange --- Banks and Banking --- Foreign Exchange --- Monetary Policy --- Currency --- Banking --- Exchange rates --- Foreign exchange intervention --- International reserves --- Real effective exchange rates --- Central banks --- Foreign exchange reserves --- United States

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The paper documents the use of foreign exchange intervention (FXI) across countries and monetary regimes, with special attention to its use under inflation targeting (IT). We find significant differences between advanced and emerging market economies, with the former group conducting FXI limitedly and broadly symmetrically, while the use of this policy instrument in emerging market countries is pervasive and mostly asymmetric (biased towards purchasing foreign currency, even after taking into account precautionary motives). Within emerging markets, the use of FXI is common both under IT and non-IT regimes. We find no evidence of FXI being used in response to inflation developments, while there is strong evidence that FXI responds to exchange rates, indicating that IT central banks in EMDEs have dual inflation/exchange rate objectives. We also find a higher propensity to overshoot inflation targets in emerging market economies where FXI is more pervasive.

Foreign Exchange --- Inflation --- Money and Monetary Policy --- International Agreements and Observance --- International Organizations --- Price Level --- Deflation --- Monetary Policy --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Macroeconomics --- Monetary economics --- Exchange rates --- Inflation targeting --- Exchange rate adjustments --- Foreign exchange intervention --- Prices --- Monetary policy --- United States

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Since the Australian dollar was floated in December 1983, the Australian central bank (Reserve Bank of Australia) has actively intervened in the foreign exchange market. Using daily exchange rate and official intervention data from January 1984 to December 2001, this paper examines what effects, if any, foreign exchange operations by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) have had on the level and volatility of the Australian dollar exchange rate. First, using an event study we evaluate the effectiveness of intervention by examining its direct effect on the level of the exchange rate. We find that over the period 1997-2001, the RBA has had some success in its intervention operations, by moderating the depreciating tendency of the Australian dollar. Second, we investigate the effects of RBA intervention policies on exchange rate volatility over the floating rate period. Our results indicate that intervention operations tend to be associated with an increase in exchange rate volatility, which suggests that official intervention may have added to market uncertainty. Overall, the effects of RBA intervention are quite modest on both the level and the volatility of the Australian dollar exchange rate.

Finance: General --- Foreign Exchange --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Information and Market Efficiency --- Event Studies --- International Financial Markets --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Finance --- Monetary economics --- Exchange rates --- Currency markets --- Exchange rate adjustments --- Currencies --- Foreign exchange intervention --- Financial markets --- Money --- Foreign exchange market --- Australia