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Complexity (Philosophy). --- Information asymmetry --- Risk --- Risk-taking (Psychology) --- Uncertainty (Information theory) --- Social aspects. --- Sociological aspects. --- Complexity (Philosophy) --- Social aspects --- Sociological aspects

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This paper investigates whether enhanced access to mobile communications, including internet, primarily through smart phones, increases competition as price information is more widely available to customers-both households and firms. The exogenous shock to identify these impacts is the transition from 2G to the 3G broadband network standard in 2008, and the induced changes in the geographic variation across districts of data plan availability for households. The operational mechanism is that better household and firm telecommunications access can close information asymmetry gaps between buyers and sellers, with increased competition leading to improved firm performance. Lower markups and reduced price dispersion can result from better incentives for firms to preserve and grow market share. And as price competition squeezes profit margins, there are more incentives for firms to reduce costs-inducing higher total factor productivity growth. Improved firm performance can generate jobs and economic transformation. Indeed, faster productivity growth, due to enhanced access for buyers to mobile telecommunications, can translate into higher formal employment and wages. One open question is whether the potential competition, driven by the increased mobile telecommunications access of buyers, which help them have the best alternative prices at their fingertips, will also impact export-oriented companies. The prior is that the firm performance improvement effect would be more salient for firms mostly focused on local markets. The primary data sources are manufacturing firm census data and household expenditure survey data across woredas (districts or counties) in Ethiopia. First, the paper investigates the relation between expanded access with the 3G network to price information through mobile phones (measured at the woreda level as share of households with substantive expenditure to access data through smartphones) and firm performance measures (markups, total factor productivity, labor productivity, wage growth, wage gaps and employment growth.), across districts with different shares of mobile telecommunication and data plan penetration subscription. The paper estimates models with difference-in-differences and triple differences. The evidence is consistent with competition intensification after the improvement in access to mobile communication due to the 3G network rollout. In particular, markups were reduced and there was higher growth in productivity, wages, and employment.

3G Broadband --- Employment --- Firm Performance --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Information Asymmetry --- Information Technology --- Internet Access --- Labor Markets --- Private Sector Development --- Private Sector Economics --- Productivity --- Social Protections and Labor

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From the bestselling author of The Black Swan, a bold book that challenges many of our long-held beliefs about risk and reward, politics and religion, finance and personal responsibility. 'Skin in the game means that you do not pay attention to what people say, only to what they do, and how much of their neck they are putting on the line'. Citizens, artisans, police, fishermen, political activists and entrepreneurs all have skin in the game. Policy wonks, corporate executives, many academics, bankers and most journalists don't. It's all about having something to lose and sharing risks with others. In his most provocative and practical book yet, Nassim Nicholas Taleb shows that skin in the game, often seen as the foundation of risk management, in fact applies to all aspects of our lives. In his inimitable style, Taleb draws on everything from Antaeus the Giant to Hammurabi to Donald Trump, from ethics to used car salesmen, to create a jaw-dropping framework for understanding this idea. Among his insights: For social justice, focus on symmetry and risk sharing. Minorities, not majorities, run the world. You can be an intellectual yet still be an idiot. Beware of complicated solutions (that someone was paid to find). Just as The Black Swan did during the 2007 financial crisis, Skin in the Game comes at precisely the right moment to challenge our long-held beliefs about risk, reward, politics, religion and business - and make us rethink everything we thought we knew.

305.6 --- Risicotheorie, speltheorie. Risicokapitaal. Beslissingsmodellen --- Cognitive psychology --- Political philosophy. Social philosophy --- Philosophy and psychology of culture --- Risk --- Risk-taking (Psychology) --- Information asymmetry --- Uncertainty (Information theory) --- Complexity (Philosophy) --- Sociological aspects --- Social aspects --- Risk - Sociological aspects --- Risk-taking (Psychology) - Social aspects --- Information asymmetry - Social aspects --- Uncertainty (Information theory) - Social aspects

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This paper develops a simple model to analyze the interaction between strategic corporate public good provision, international firm location and national regulation. An information-based strategic corporate public good provision mechanism is proposed to shed light on recent firm behavior within different regulatory environments. The main insight derived is that in the presence of firms with geographic flexibility (multinational enterprises) and market provision of an international public credence good, unilateral (non-cooperative) regulatory scope depends on (1) the absolute probabilities to verify firms' corporate public good provision levels within different geographic and institutional environments, and (2) the differential between these probabilities across countries. The relative information asymmetry determines not only the market levels of the public good produced under autarky, but also the relocation incentives of multinational enterprises. A firm trades off lower production costs, which increase its competitiveness in pricing, with higher expected informational price premiums, which decrease its competitiveness. A government's ability to regulate above market (corporate public good provision) levels decreases with the absolute level of foreign transparency, while it increases in the relative (positive) difference between the same transparency at home and abroad. This may not only explain mixed empirical evidence of theoretic propositions such as the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and Regulatory Race to the Bottom dynamics, but also open up interesting policy implications as the international information playing field becomes leveled through development, while existing regulations are rather rigid, and policy coordination remains limited.

Corporate Strategy --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Environmental Economics & Policies --- Information Asymmetry --- International Firm Location --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Private Sector Development --- Public Goods Provision --- Regulation

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Frustration with the performance of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) has led to two rounds of reform: the first round, from the 1960s through the 1980s, attempted to improve SOE performance while maintaining public ownership while the second, beginning in the late 1980s, viewed privatization as the answer. Interest in the earlier round of reform has increased recently as controversy has slowed or halted privatization in many countries, especially for SOEs providing infrastructure services that are basic to everyday life and are thought to have elements of monopoly. This paper reexamines the earlier round of reforms, focusing particularly on efforts to increase the firms' capacity with infusions of human and physical capital, to strengthen managerial incentives through performance contracts and corporatization and to alter the mix of political and economic forces that impinge on the firm by strengthening the involvement of taxpayers, customers or private investors. The review suggests that these earlier approaches generated only modest success but that some of them, selectively applied, may be helpful in improving the performance of infrastructure firms that remain in public hands.

Capital Markets --- Debt Markets --- Developing Countries --- E-Business --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Support --- Government Capacity --- Information Asymmetry --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- International Bank --- Legal System --- Microfinance --- Political Economy --- Private Capital --- Private Investors --- Private Participation in Infrastructure --- Private Sector Development