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« Après la loi, il y a le droit ; après la loi, il y a la totalité de ce dont la loi a signé l'oubli ; il y a l'invention et le désordre, le savoir et l'exploration, la multiplicité et la singularité, les êtres et les choses, la force des gestes et celle des mots. Après la lex, il y a le ius, le li, le giri, le dharma, la fiqh, la aggadah, la maât et le dînum ; après le nomos, il y a l'anomie, l'anarchie, l'injustice, l'arbitraire, la casuistique, la magie, le récit, la religion, les rituels. Après la loi, il y a l'ensemble des moyens que les êtres humains ont inventé pour devenir plutôt qu'être, et pour faire devenir avec eux les relations qui les unissaient à d'autres et finissaient par les constituer en groupes. Car telle est la différence principale qui sépare la loi du droit : la loi ne connaît que l'être, un être à la défense duquel elle est vouée par structure et par fonction – un être qu'il est de son devoir de ne pas remettre en question. »

Law (Philosophical concept)

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"This important new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers. Moreover in this collaborative task, different participants have a moral duty to respect each other's contributions."--Bloomsbury Publishing.

Law (Philosophical concept)

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Law (Philosophical concept) --- Law --- Philosophy.

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Law --- Law (Philosophical concept) --- Philosophy

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Law --- Law (Philosophical concept) --- Philosophy --- Philosophy.