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In many markets, industry and policymakers agree that there may be too many insurers. In others, the consensus is that there could be benefit from more competition. But this broad consensus is often supported by evidence that is more qualitative, anecdotal, or judgmental despite being unanimous. What is less clear, however, is how far consolidation or liberalization will go, how fast, and when it will end. This paper presents some initial observations from a cross-country data set and proposes that individual country results can be interpreted against this data set to inform expectations regarding trends in competition, concentration and consolidation, to inform analysis of the sector, for individual firm strategic planning and wider market risk assessments. A "natural level" for measures is suggested as a starting hypothesis. Further consideration is then made of the role of absolute market size, stage of market development, and differentials between life and non life segments. Analysis of the natural level, adjusted for market conditions, can then be used to develop preliminary views on current and expected market dynamics, strategic planning, and to inform policy, regulatory and supervisory priorities.

Debt Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Gross domestic product --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market conditions --- Market development --- Market entry --- Market risk --- Market risk assessments --- MARKET SHARE --- Markets and Market Access --- Monopolies --- Monopoly --- Price wars --- Private Sector Development

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This thesis was written as part of a project thesis carried out within the Risk Department of Banque Havilland. The projects it defines and presents have been designed as part of the development of interest rate risk management tools to meet the European Banking Authority's recent requirements in this area. The purpose of this thesis is to present this new regulation, document the tools used and issue conclusions based on the analysis of the results obtained. The overall project is divided into four major parts. 

The resistance test
The first step, after understanding the regulatory framework and the various legal texts relating to interest rate risk, was to measure the bank's exposure, in terms of economic value and future income, to various scenarios for changes in the yield curve. This measurement was carried out using a resistance test. To do so, we had to make different assumptions, follow the calculation methodologies recommended by the European Banking Authority and apply different scenarios for changes in the yield curve. The results of this test are presented in the conclusion section.

Interest rate risk management procedure
Based on these measures, we have developed an interest rate risk management procedure, including the definition of the risk, the selection of the instruments concerned, the calculation methodologies, the bank's "Risk Appetite" in this area as well as the distribution of roles and the procedure to be followed in terms of governance.

Development of a main component analysis
This main component analysis was developed to analyze the dynamics of the yield curve and with the final objective of finding other shock scenarios for this curve to apply to our stress test. In addition to the exploration of the theoretical concept, this thesis explains the methodology used, some problems encountered and the results of the analysis.

Design of new scenarios via Monte-Carlo simulation
Two scenarios of changes in the yield curve were developed by simulating many linear combinations of these main components. The methodology followed and the results of this "Monte-Carlo" are presented in this thesis.

Assets and Liabilities Management --- Banque Havilland --- Interest rate Risk --- principal component analysis --- Monte-Carlo Simulation --- IRRBB Management --- Basel III --- EBA Guidelines --- Market risk --- Sciences économiques & de gestion > Finance

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Advocates for internal model-based capital regulation argue that this approach will reduce costs and remove distortions that are created by rules-based capital regulations. These claims are examined using a Merton-style model of deposit insurance. Analysis shows that internal model-based capital estimates are biased by safety-net-generated funding subsidies that convey to bank shareholders when market and credit risk regulatory capital requirements are set using bank internal model estimates. These subsidies are not uniform across the risk spectrum, and, as a consequence, internal model regulatory capital requirements will cause distortions in bank lending behavior.

Banks and Banking --- Insurance --- Investments: Bonds --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Insurance Companies --- Actuarial Studies --- Financial services law & regulation --- Banking --- Investment & securities --- Insurance & actuarial studies --- Credit risk --- Market risk --- Bonds --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking

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Stress tests are the main practical tools of macroprudential oversight. This paper reviews the stress-testing practices of central banks in Central and South Eastern Europe (CSEECBs) and outlines the challenges in the area of stress testing going forward. The authors discuss good practice and the applied approaches by CSEECBs focusing on the main components of a typical macroprudential stress test, id est constructing the baseline and stress scenarios, mapping macroeconomic scenarios and microeconomic factors to risk factors, calculating risk exposures to different risk indicators, and estimating outcome indicators to inform macroprudential policy. The main challenges for the CSEECBs going forward involve needed improvements in data reliability, consideration of quantitative microprudential indicators in macroprudential stress tests, explicit incorporation of dynamics in stress tests to include reaction functions of banks and macroprudential policy, institutionalization of macroprudential policy responses to alarming stress-test results, use of the top-down and bottom-up stress test results in supervisory communication, cooperation of macroprudential and microprudential supervision, and information exchange for better cross-border supervision of international banking groups.

Accounting --- Bank of Canada --- Banking sector --- Banking systems --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Capital adequacy --- Central banks --- Credit risk --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Data reliability --- Debt Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial data --- Financial institutions --- Financial Intermediation --- Financial stability --- Financial systems --- International banking --- Macroeconomic conditions --- Market risk --- Operational risk --- Private Sector Development --- Risk factors --- Supervisory authorities --- Technical assistance

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This paper presents an assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) in New Zealand. The supervisory approach of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) reflects the characteristics of the local banking industry and the authorities’ goal to limit moral hazard by relying on market discipline and not offering deposit insurance. Banks offer traditional products in a highly concentrated market. Since the most recent Financial Sector Assessment Program, the RBNZ has increased attention to strengthening regulatory discipline. The current approach to supervision is limited by the heavy weight the RBNZ places on market discipline compared with regulatory discipline. Better compliance with the BCP and enhanced effectiveness of the RBNZ three-pillar approach are recommended.

Financial institutions. --- Financial intermediaries --- Lending institutions --- Associations, institutions, etc. --- Banks and Banking --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Banking --- Financial services law & regulation --- Market risk --- Credit risk --- Capital adequacy requirements --- Operational risk --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Bank supervision --- Liquidity risk --- Banks and banking --- Financial risk management --- Asset requirements --- State supervision --- New Zealand