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"The two main competing traditions in mainstream metaethics are cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional view of this divide is that the cognitivist understands moral (and other normative) judgments as representational states (e.g. beliefs) whereas the non-cognitivist understands them instead as non-representational states - typically as desire-like states of some kind (e.g. emotions, plans, preferences). Because moral and other normative judgments genuinely do seem to have both belief-like and desire-like elements, this debate has seen each side going through seemingly endless epicycles to either accommodate or debunk what the other side explains easily. Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in theories which transcend these categories by holding that moral and other normative judgments are themselves constituted by both belief-like and desire-like elements and/or that moral and other normative judgments 'express' both belief-like and desire-like states. These are called hybrid theories. The papers in this volume, all new, both provide a guide to the state of the art in this debate and push it forward along numerous fronts"--

General ethics --- Metaethics --- Meta-ethics --- Ethics --- Knowledge, Theory of

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How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections.

Metaethics. --- Ethics. --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Philosophy --- Values --- Meta-ethics --- Ethics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Meta-ethics. --- moral philosophy. --- normativity.

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This book provides a theory of the juridification of business ethics. Ethical codes pop up everywhere in the business world and increasingly resemble the code of law. A focus on compliance rather than reflection becomes the norm. Legal perspectives replace ethical perspectives, turning ethicists into lawyers without a law degree. This juridification of business ethics conceals a diminishing trust in ethics, as legal reasoning substitutes philosophical thinking. By appealing to the critical study of law, Bart Jansen advocates for a renewed focus on the ethical side of business. This book shows the importance of a good balance between law and ethics in business and is of great interest to both academics and professionals.

Business ethics. --- Metaethics. --- Business Ethics. --- Meta-Ethics. --- Meta-ethics --- Ethics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Business --- Businesspeople --- Commercial ethics --- Corporate ethics --- Corporation ethics --- Professional ethics --- Wealth --- Moral and ethical aspects

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This Element presents an interpretation and defence of Philippa Foot's ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot's account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot's metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot's metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.

Metaethics. --- Foot, Philippa --- Ethics. --- Meta-ethics --- Ethics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Bosanquet, Philippa

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Conceptual engineering is a newly flourishing branch of philosophy which investigates problems with our concepts and considers how they might be ameliorated: 'truth', for instance, is susceptible to paradox, and it's not clear what 'race' stands for. This is the first collective exploration of possibilities and problems of conceptual engineering.

Metaphysics. --- Metaethics. --- Concepts. --- Philosophy --- God --- Ontology --- Philosophy of mind --- Meta-ethics --- Ethics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Concept formation --- Abstraction --- Perception --- Psychology --- Conceptualism. --- Nominalism --- Realism --- Scholasticism --- Universals (Philosophy)