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Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.
Axelrod, Robert. --- Banks, Jeffrey. --- Baron, David. --- Binmore, Ken. --- Calvert, Randall. --- Coke machine example. --- Cuban Missile Crisis. --- Downs, Anthony. --- Eatwell, John. --- Enelow, James. --- Ferejohn, John. --- Harsanyi, John. --- Jackman, Robert. --- Kreps, David. --- Ledyard, John. --- Luce, R. Duncan. --- Morrow, James. --- Nalebuff, Barry. --- Ordeshook, Peter. --- Palfrey, Thomas. --- Raiffa, Howard. --- babbling equilibrium. --- feasible payoffs. --- information set. --- international crises. --- node.
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Robert Powell argues persuasively and elegantly for the usefulness of formal models in studying international conflict and for the necessity of greater dialogue between modeling and empirical analysis. Powell makes it clear that many widely made arguments about the way states act under threat do not hold when subjected to the rigors of modeling. In doing so, he provides a more secure foundation for the future of international relations theory. Powell argues that, in the Hobbesian environment in which states exist, a state can respond to a threat in at least three ways: (1) it can reallocate resources already under its control; (2) it can try to defuse the threat through bargaining and compromise; (3) it can try to draw on the resources of other states by allying with them. Powell carefully outlines these three responses and uses a series of game theoretic models to examine each of them, showing that the models make the analysis of these responses more precise than would otherwise be possible. The advantages of the modeling-oriented approach, Powell contends, have been evident in the number of new insights they have made possible in international relations theory. Some argue that these advances could have originated in ordinary-language models, but as Powell notes, they did not in practice do so. The book focuses on the insights and intuitions that emerge during modeling, rather than on technical analysis, making it accessible to readers with only a general background in international relations theory.
International relations --- Axelrod, Robert. --- Bueno de Mesquita. --- Cooter, Robert. --- Cruz, Jose. --- Doran, Charles. --- Downs, George. --- Eisenhower, Dwight. --- Fearon, James. --- Frank, Philipp. --- Fudenberg, Drew. --- Gaddis, John. --- Gilpin, Robert. --- Glaser, Charles. --- Hitler, Adolph. --- Jervis, Robert. --- Kaplan, Morton. --- Keohane, Robert. --- Kugler, Jacek. --- Levy, Jack. --- Lipson, Charles. --- Mansfield, Edward. --- Morgenthau, Hans. --- Nalebuff, Barry. --- Niou, Emerson. --- Pearl Harbor. --- Quandt, Richard. --- Schweller, Randall. --- Snyder, Jack. --- anarchy. --- balance-of-power theory. --- hazard rate.
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