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Criminal responsibility is now central to criminal law, but it is in need of re-examination. In the context of Australian criminal laws, Self, Others and the State reassesses the general assumptions made about the rise to prominence of criminal responsibility in the period since around the turn of the twentieth century. It reconsiders the role of criminal responsibility in criminal law, arguing that criminal responsibility is significant because it organises key sets of relations - between self, others and the state - as relations of responsibility. Detailed studies of decisive moments and developments since the turn of the twentieth century, and original explorations of relations of responsibility, expose the complexity and dynamism of criminal responsibility and reveal that it is the means by which matters of subjectivity, relationality and power make themselves felt in the criminal law.

Criminal liability --- Accountability, Criminal --- Criminal accountability --- Criminal responsibility --- Liability, Criminal --- Responsibility, Criminal --- Liability (Law) --- Law and legislation

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Criminal law --- Criminal liability. --- Accountability, Criminal --- Criminal accountability --- Criminal liability --- Criminal responsibility --- Liability, Criminal --- Responsibility, Criminal --- Liability (Law) --- Philosophy. --- Law and legislation --- Philosophy

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With this volume, Michael Moore offers the first thorough examination of the retributivist theory of the criminal law. He not only defends the theory, but also details the implications it would have for the general structure of criminal law.

Criminal liability --- Law, General & Comparative --- Law, Politics & Government --- Accountability, Criminal --- Criminal accountability --- Criminal responsibility --- Liability, Criminal --- Responsibility, Criminal --- Liability (Law) --- Law and legislation --- Responsabilidad penal --- Derecho

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Law regulates human behaviour, a phenomenon about which neuroscience has much to say. Neuroscience can tell us whether a defendant suffers from a brain abnormality, or injury and it can correlate these neural deficits with criminal offending. Using fMRI and other technologies it might indicate whether a witness is telling lies or the truth. It can further propose neuro-interventions to 'change' the brains of offenders and so to reduce their propensity to offend. And, it can make suggestions about whether a defendant knows or merely suspects a prohibited state of affairs; so, drawing distinctions among the mental states that are central to legal responsibility. Each of these matters has philosophical import; is a neurological 'deficit' inculpatory or exculpatory; what is the proper role for law if the mind is no more than the brain; is lying really a brain state and can neuroscience really 'read' the brain? In this edited collection, leading contributors to the field provide new insights on these matters, bringing to light the great challenges that arise when disciplinary boundaries merge.

Neurobiology --- Criminal liability --- Accountability, Criminal --- Criminal accountability --- Criminal responsibility --- Liability, Criminal --- Responsibility, Criminal --- Liability (Law) --- Neurosciences --- Social aspects. --- Psychological aspects. --- Law and legislation

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In dit boek wordt de interpretatie van opzet, schuld en schulduitsluitingsgronden in verband gebracht met de doelen die ten grondslag liggen aan straf. De auteur verdedigt een Rawlsiaanse theorie van aansprakelijkheid en straf. Leidend beginsel is het controleprincipe: opzet, schuld en schulduitsluitingsgronden moeten burgers controle geven over het al dan niet in aanraking komen met het strafrecht. De auteur betoogt dat te snel veroordeeld wordt voor culpose delicten. Enerzijds wijst hij op de geringe gevaarlijkheid van typische culpose gedragingen.Anderzijds waarschuwt hij voor psychologische biases die rechters ertoe nopen te snel schuld aan te nemen. De interpretatie van opzet vormt een heet hangijzer in de doctrine.Veel schrijvers menen dat opzet een normatief begrip is, waarbij het niet gaat om de psychische gesteldheid van de verdachte. De auteur betoogt daarentegen dat een psychisch opzetbegrip de voorkeur verdient. Hij verdedigt een cognitieve interpretatie van opzet: het gaat om ‘weten’ en niet om ‘willen’. Deze bevindingen zijn van belang voor de grens tussen voorwaardelijk opzet en schuld. Sinds het Porsche-arrest en de Hiv-arresten bestaat grote onduidelijkheid over het bereik van voorwaardelijk opzet. Alwin van Dijk studeerde rechten en psychologie aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Deze uitgave is het resultaat van promotieonderzoek bij de vakgroep strafrecht aan de zelfde universiteit.

Criminal law. Criminal procedure --- Aansprakelijkheid [Strafrechtelijke ] --- Criminal liability --- Criminal liability--Law and legislation --- Criminal responsibility --- Imputabilité --- Liability [Criminal] --- Majorité pénale --- Responsabilité (Droit pénal) --- Responsabilité criminelle --- Responsabilité pénale --- Responsibility [Criminal] --- Schade --- Statut pénal --- Strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid --- Accountability [Criminal ] --- Criminal accountability --- Criminal liability -- Law and legislation --- Responsibility [Criminal ] --- Criminal liability - Netherlands