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When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it.
Accountability --- Bad governance --- Bribery --- Citizens --- Corruption --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Income --- Inequality --- National Governance --- Poor governance --- Public Officials --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Public Service Delivery
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When seeking a public service, users may be required to pay in bribes more than the official price. Consequently, some users may be discouraged and choose not to seek a service due to the higher price imposed by the bribery "tax." This paper explores the price and quantity components of the relationship between governance and service delivery using micro-level survey data. The authors construct new measures of governance using data from users of public services from 13 government agencies in Peru. For some basic services, low-income users pay a larger share of their income than wealthier ones do; that is, the bribery tax is regressive. Where there are substitute private providers, low-income users appear to be discouraged more often and not to seek basic services. Thus, bribery may penalize poorer users twice - acting as a regressive tax and discouraging access to basic services. The paper explores the characteristics of households seeking public services. Higher education and age are associated with higher probability of being discouraged. Trust in state institutions decreases the probability of being discouraged, while knowledge of mechanisms to report corruption and extent of social network increase it, suggesting that households may rely on substitutes through networks. The study complements the household analysis with supply-side analysis based on data from public officials, and constructs agency-level measures for access to public services and institutional factors. Econometric results suggest that corruption reduces the supply of services, while voice mechanisms and clarity of the public agency's mission increase it.
Accountability --- Bad governance --- Bribery --- Citizens --- Corruption --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Income --- Inequality --- National Governance --- Poor governance --- Public Officials --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Public Service Delivery
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Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, selling, or trading votes is inherently wrong. In this provocative book, Jason Brennan challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens--in fact, he argues, many people owe it to the rest of us not to vote. Bad choices at the polls can result in unjust laws, needless wars, and calamitous economic policies. Brennan shows why voters have duties to make informed decisions in the voting booth, to base their decisions on sound evidence for what will create the best possible policies, and to promote the common good rather than their own self-interest. They must vote well--or not vote at all. Brennan explains why voting is not necessarily the best way for citizens to exercise their civic duty, and why some citizens need to stay away from the polls to protect the democratic process from their uninformed, irrational, or immoral votes. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to vote. This book reveals why sometimes it's best if they don't. In a new afterword, "How to Vote Well," Brennan provides a practical guidebook for making well-informed, well-reasoned choices at the polls.
Voting --- Applied ethics. --- Ethics. --- Voting ethics. --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Moral and ethical aspects. --- Agency Argument. --- Civic Virtue Argument. --- Public Goods Argument. --- abstention. --- autonomy. --- bad governance. --- bad voting. --- beneficial policies. --- causal responsibility. --- citizens. --- civic duty. --- civic virtue. --- common good. --- community volunteering. --- contemporary liberal democracies. --- deference. --- democracy. --- egoistic voting. --- epistemic justification. --- epistemic standards. --- extrapolitical conception. --- fortuitous voting. --- good governance. --- good intentions. --- good policy. --- good voting. --- government policies. --- government. --- harmful policies. --- harmful voting. --- independent judgment. --- informed decisions. --- military service. --- moral obligation. --- moral obligations. --- moral virtue. --- national interest. --- news. --- personal biases. --- political beliefs. --- political judgment. --- political movements. --- political participation. --- political parties. --- politics. --- public-spirited voting. --- self-interest. --- social order. --- social science. --- social-scientific literature. --- sound evidence. --- vote buying. --- vote commodification. --- vote selling. --- voters. --- voting ethics. --- voting rights. --- voting. --- welfare. --- Balloting --- Democracy --- Moral and ethical aspects --- Voting - Moral and ethical aspects
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