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This paper compares redistribution through trade restrictions versus domestic lump-sum transfers. When preferences are non-homothetic, even domestic lump-sum transfers affect relative prices. Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, domestic lump-sum transfers are not necessarily superior to distortionary trade policy. The paper develops this argument in the context of the food export bans imposed by many developing countries in the late 2000s.

Non-Homothetic Preferences --- Redistribution --- Trade Restrictions

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Si on connaît le poids de l’armée, de la marine ou du service de la dette, les circuits internes qu’emprunte, au XVIIIe siècle, l’argent de l’État redistributeur demeurent encore obscurs. Les dotations des principales caisses centrales, les transferts de fonds de caisse à caisse, les ordres de paiement, notamment sur les caisses provinciales, et finalement l’acquittement des dépenses auprès des nombreux destinataires des fonds publics n’ont pas été étudiés en tant que tels. Or, apprécier la manière dont l’État organise la gestion de ses dépenses, met en œuvre les modalités de redistribution de l’argent public, et fait face (ou non) à ses obligations de paiement, nous renseigne utilement sur les relations financières qu’il entretient avec la société. Comment l’État paye les Français ? Qu’il s’agisse du paiement des soldes, gages, rentes, remboursement des corvées militaires, exemptions, remises fiscales, indemnités des expropriés, pensions, gratifications..., par quelles voies les fonds parviennent-ils à leurs destinataires ? Selon quel ordre de priorité, quelle forme (espèces, billets), quel délai ? Les travaux issus de cette journée d’études s’intéressent aux paiements de l’État moderne en observant l’administration monarchique dans un rôle plutôt gratifiant celui de dispensateur des deniers royaux, sans pour autant oublier que cette capacité de redistribution constitue l’exact pendant d’une capacité de prélèvement rendue possible par le monopole de la violence légitime.

Economics --- History --- monarchie --- administration --- fonds publics --- dépenses --- redistribution

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Catalysis. --- Cleavage. --- Ge-ge bonds. --- Redistribution reactions. --- Spectra.

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"Justice and Vulnerability in Europe contributes to the understanding of justice in Europe from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. It shows that Europe is falling short of its ideals and justice-related ambitions by repeatedly failing its most vulnerable populations. Interdisciplinary and expert contributors search for the explanations behind these failing ambitions, through analysis of institutional discourse, legal debate and practice and the daily experiences of vulnerable populations, such as those dependent on social care and welfare. By setting tentative criteria for justice as 'participatory parity', in line with the insights of the political philosopher Nancy Fraser, the book challenges European policy makers to re-define redistributive, recognitive and representative justice. Original and incisive, Justice and Vulnerability in Europe is an invaluable resource for policy makers at European, national and local levels. It is also highly relevant to scholars and students of public and social policy, social justice, politics and law"--

Distributive justice --- Justice (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Europe --- recognition --- justice --- redistribution --- vulnerability --- representation

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A large-scale economic experiment, conducted on a representative sample of the US population, shows that cooperation creates special moral obligations. Participants in the experiment, acting as impartial spectators, transferred significantly more money to an unlucky worker when two individuals had cooperated than when they had worked independently. The authors further show that the effect of cooperation is strongly associated with political affiliation, with Democrats attaching significantly more importance to cooperation as a source of moral obligation than Republicans. The findings shed light on the foundations of redistributive preferences and may contribute to explain the often observed asymmetry in moral concern for different groups of individuals, both nationally and internationally.

Cooperation --- Governance --- Inequality --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Moral Obligation --- Political Economy --- Poverty Reduction --- Redistribution --- Social Accountability